The second in a series of three reports entitled, “The Stolen Lands of Afghanistan and its People; The State Land Distribution System,” this report focuses on how state lands are distributed. This paper is the result of a desktop review and joint research by the UNAMA Rule of Law Unit (RoL) and the Civil Affairs Unit (CAU) in seven provinces—Kabul, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Herat, Gardez, and Kandahar.

This country profile presents the Land Matrix data for Cambodia, detailing large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) transactions that:

• entail a transfer ofrights to use, control or own land through sale, lease or concession;

• have an intended size of 200 hectares (ha) or larger;

• have been concluded since the year 2000;

• are affected by a change of use (often from extensive or ecosystem service provision to commercial use);

• include deals for agricultural and forestry purposes. Mining operations are excluded.

Each of the post-Soviet Central Asian states inherited both inefficient collectivized agricultural systems and an understanding of the nation rooted in categories defined by Soviet nationality policy. Despite the importance placed on territorial homelands in many contemporary understandings of nationalism, the divergent formal responses to these dual Soviet legacies have generally been studied in isolation from one another.

This paper examines the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in Tajikistan. Recent legislation allows farmers to obtain access to heritable land shares for private use, but reform has been geographically uneven. The break-up of state farms has occurred in some areas where agriculture has little to offer but, where high value crops are grown, land reform has hardly begun. In cases where collectivized farming persists and land has not been distributed, productivity remains low and individual households benefit little from farming.

The caste system is an intricate part of the institutional structure as well as class formation, political instability and conflicts in Nepal. The most severely discriminated group in the caste system is the Dalits, the so-called “untouchables”. Dalits faced religious, occupational and even, territorial discrimination. They were traditionally excluded from receiving education, using public resources, and had no rights to own land (Dahal 1995; CHRGJ 2005; Haug, Aasland and Dahal 2009).

Agricultural census data and fieldwork observations are used to analyze changes in land cover/use intensity across Rondônia and Mato Grosso states along the agricultural frontier in the Brazilian Amazon. Results show that the development of land use is strongly related to land distribution structure. While large farms have increased their share of annual and perennial crops, small and medium size farms have strongly contributed to the development of beef and milk market chains in both Rondônia and Mato Grosso.

Cameroon’s current land law appears to have two conflicting objectives: to attract investors through large-scale land concessions while simultaneously protecting biodiversity, defending local people’s rights and promoting rural development. But the legislation governing large-scale land-based investments is outdated and sometimes incoherent. The land allocation process is investor driven and does not appropriately balance economic, social or environmental considerations.

While land reforms have long been motivated as a potential policy lever of rural growth and development, there is remarkably little evidence of the direct impacts of such reforms. In an effort to fill this lacunae, this paper examines South Africa's Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program. We show that the implementation of this program operates as a natural experiment in which self-selected and administratively-filltered LRAD applicants receive land transfers at random points in time.

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution. The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land.

The distribution of property rights has a strong impact on output when, due to the non-contractibility of some inputs, market contracts do not yield efficient outcomes. In this Paper I analyse how the distribution of land rights affects the choice of both contractible techniques – such as crop mix or irrigation – and non-contractible effort when these are complements in production. I present evidence from rural Nicaragua suggesting that farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive/highly profitable crops on the plots they own rather than on the plots they rent.

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution. The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land.