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This paper discusses the internal processes and decisions that characterized thetransition from collectively held group ranches to individualized property systems amongthe Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado district in Kenya. It addresses the question of whygroup ranch members would demand individualized property systems, but then turnagainst the outcome. In addressing this puzzle the paper discusses the process of landallocation and distribution during group ranch subdivision. It examines who the mainactors were during subdivision, their degree of latitude in crafting and changing rules,and the interactions between Maasai and state institutions. Findings suggest that, becausethe process by which property rights change is so intertwined with politics, we may needto move beyond economic models of relative price changes and state enforcement inorder to better understand such transitions. Models that accommodate competition byactors and the possibility that state actors may not provide the arbitration or enforcementthat is often taken for granted are more useful for analyzing the complexities of shiftingproperty rights. When the possibility for conflict and competition is factored into theproperty rights equation, the relative gains from privatizing/individualizing may not be aslarge or as obvious as anticipated.
