This chapter challenges one of the main tenets of agricultural economics—that households behave as though they are single individuals, with production factors allocated efficiently between men and women. In many contexts this is a convenient and innocuous assumption. It can be quite restrictive, however, when investigating the causes and welfare consequences of gender differences in agriculture.

Much empirical work has approached the problem of how resource allocations are made within households from the perspective that if preferences differ, welfare outcomes depend on the power of individuals to exert their own preferences. Measures of power are therefore a central component of quantitative empirical approaches to understanding how different preferences translate into different welfare outcomes. Following most of the empirical studies in this genre, this chapter focuses on dynamics within couples.

Among financial institutions serving poor households around the world, microfinance programs have emerged as important players. These programs typically make small loans—sometimes as small as US$50 to US$100 and sometimes as large as several thousand dollars-to households lacking access to formal-sector banks (see, for example, Lapenu and Zeller 2001). One important achievement of the microfinance movement has been its relative success in deliberately reaching out to poor women living in diverse socioeconomic environments.

The collective model of the household predicts that bargaining power determines the share of resources allocated to an individual within the household. The concept of bargaining power is elusive, however. It is perhaps useful at this point to outline the possible determinants of bargaining power, while not making any claims to measure power itself.

Most economic research treats the household as a single agent, assuming that individuals within the household share the same preferences or that there is a household “head” who has the final say. This simple framework has proved immensely useful; despite a common misperception, it can explain many differences in well-being or consumption patterns within households.

Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach is known as the “unitary model,” the “common preference model,” or the “joint family utility model,” depending on the study consulted.

This book synthesizes IFPRI's recent work on the role of gender in household decisionmaking in developing countries, provides evidence on how reducing gender gaps can contribute to improved food security, health, and nutrition in developing countries, and gives examples of interventions that actually work to reduce gender disparities. It is an accessible, easy-to-read synthesis of the gender research that IFPRI has undertaken in the 1990s.

La dégradation des ressources naturelles est devenue un problème mondial qui menace les moyens d’existence de millions de pauvres. De nombreuses technologies très prometteuses sont actuellement disponibles, notamment en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, mais les exploitants agricoles et les autres intervenants hésitent souvent à les employer. Pourquoi? Bien que de nombreux facteurs puissent l’expliquer, l’absence de droits de propriété garantis et l’insuffisance d’actions collectives devrait retenir l’attention des décideurs et des développeurs
de technologie.

"Degradation of natural resources has become a global problem that threatens the livelihood of millions of poor people. Many promising technologies for natural resource management are available to address these problems, but farmers and others often fail to adopt them. Why is this? Although many factors can be identified, lack of secure property rights and collective action deserve greater attention from policy makers and technology developers.

Documento presentado en la "Reunión Técnica Internacional sobre Comunidades Indígenas, Tierra, Desarrollo e Institucionalidad.2008" Conclusiones principales: • Necesidad de articular y mantener un vínculo entre las organizaciones de carácter social y político con las organizaciones de carácter económico. • La planificación territorial es menos preponderante en términos de desarrollo, que la constitución y representación de actores sociales, que luego interactúan con las instituciones públicas y privadas.

This LEGEND bulletin takes stock of some of the recent experience in legal empowerment. The result is a kaleidoscope of approaches operating at different levels, but pursuing broadly converging agendas.

It is widely accepted among economists and policy-makers that secure and well-defined land property rights are integral to poverty alleviation and economic prosperity. But how do legal systems, land tenure and economic development really relate to one another? Our author demonstrates the links using her latest research results from 146 countries.