This paper examines the role of property rights and community control in promoting forest conservation, and extends the classic framework of the bundles of property rights to non-consumptive resources and ecosystem services. Common property resources are first contrasted with protected areas, and then combined to develop a conceptual framework for common property protected areas (CPPA). A case study of a communally owned forest reserve in Costa Rica shows how the CPPA model identifies various stakeholders and their roles, rights and responsibilities.

Institutional thinking has long been central to fisheries governance. Defined in its most generic form as structural constraints that provide regularities, reduce uncertainties and shape people's interactions, institutions create an enabling or controlling environment for specific governing actions and decisions to take place. Over the years, fisheries governance has relied heavily on the creation and evolution of institutions, especially those related to property rights and access rules.

A new social forestry program has been implemented in Java to overcome encroachment of state forests. In this program, the state and local communities jointly manage the state forests and share the benefits of increased forest resource stock and flow as a result of the management. This article aims to investigate the complete incentive structure of the social forestry program and how the incentive structure changes community member participation in forest management. Property rights transfers and economic analyses were employed to analyze the incentive structure.

In the Brazilian Amazon, insecure property rights are among the main causes of land conflicts and deforestation. Through an in-depth empirical case study in Maranhao in the Eastern Amazon, this research analyzes how distorted agrarian, forest and environmental policies, laws and regulations originated insecure property rights not only over land, but also over timber, which allied to social and political factors, such as uneven distribution of land and strong organization of landless peasants, led to land conflicts and deforestation.

This study tries to examine the determinants of the choice of fuel wood sources in ruralEthiopia. Survey data collected from a sample of rural households in the East Gojam andSouth Wollo zones of the Amhara region of the country were used for the analysis. Amultinomial probit model that allows correlation between the residuals has beenemployed to address the question of whether household’s socioeconomic, environmentand institutional variables affect the choice of fuel wood source in rural Ethiopia.

The Prunus genus represents one of the main targets for regulating the health status of plants. Individual plant tagging with an implanted microchip may support plant certification or protect property rights, in addition to having research applications. Production of radiofrequency identification (RFID) implants in Prunus spp. plants was performed following two tagging procedures designed to consider Prunus anatomy, histology and grafting techniques.

This paper addresses water scarcity issues in the American West and examines the allocation of water through the appropriative rights system and the extent markets are used to reallocate water from low- to high-valued uses. The unique physical properties of water make it difficult to bound and measure, which makes defining property rights difficult. Markets are also impeded by disputes over third-party effects due to the interdependencies of water users and complex institutional arrangements that dilute decision-making authority.

This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate).

In 1999, an international expert team found the neglect of biodiversity issues in Swiss forest policy to be one of its biggest weaknesses. Influenced by this scientific assessment, the Federal Forest Agency developed forest reserve guidelines with measurable objectives in cooperation with the constituent states (cantons). To assess the outcomes of the Swiss forest reserve concept, we surveyed cantons’ implementation degree in 2011. In a previous paper, Kaeser et al.

The System-wide Program for Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi)sponsored an International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for theManagement of Rangelands in Dry Areas, May 7-11, 2001 in Hammamet, Tunisia.