This paper presents a conceptual framework on how institutions of property rightsand collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including through externalinterventions and action by poor people themselves. The first part of the paperexamines the initial conditions of poverty, highlighting the role of assets, risks andvulnerability, legal structures and power relations.

Natural resource management perceived as a search for institutions that can ensure simultaneous fulfilment of three goals: productivity (or efficiency), sustainability and equity. In this article, we study the implications of pursuing the goal of equity in the management of surface water resources for irrigation with a heuristic model incorporating a Leontief-type fixed production function. The analysis has been carried out in the backdrop of the Baliraja water distribution experiment in India.

Today, the international community faces two major development challenges: how to ignite growth and how to establish democracy. Economic research has identified two plausible hypotheses regarding this association. The first hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with democracy and institutions that secure property rights. The second hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with physical and human capital accumulation.

This article examines how property rights expectations affect resource management incentives. It utilizes expected property rights over different timespans and of different strengths, corresponding to (a) investments of different intensities and (b) farmers' sense of security regarding their often de facto property rights. The results suggest that property rights and their alienability in ten-year time matter to intensive infrastructural investments, although not to lighter investments.

In Afghanistan, where 80% of the population is rural, irrigated agriculture using surface water is an extremely important economic activity. With the advent of the New Water Law, highly localized and centuries-old agricultural water management traditions are giving way to more modern centralized institutions. The newly-created river basin councils need management tools to support decision-making at the watershed level.

Contemporary theoretical accounts of common pool resource management assume that communities are able to develop institutions for sustainable resource management if they are given security of access and appropriate rights of management. In recent years comprehensive legal reforms of communal rural resource management in Namibia have sought to create an institutional framework linking the sustainable use of natural resources (game, water, forest) and rural development.

This paper introduces and applies an analytical framework to study how formal andinformal institutions influence socio–economic change and poverty reduction inrural Cambodia, giving specific reference to property rights and collective action. Itfocuses on emerging endogenous mechanisms of cooperation as well as on the roleof external actors and instruments in forming or enhancing collective actioninstitutions, and enforcing use and ownership rights among the rural poor.

While much attention has been given to examining various aspects of poverty, anumber of studies have shown that institutional environment in which the poorexist conditions welfare outcomes, thus highlighting the inherently crucialimportance of institutions for poverty reduction. The institutions of property rightsand collective action are among those identified as playing a major role in thelivelihood strategies of the poor.

This paper investigates empirically the effect of land invasions on farm production decisions. The main hypothesis is that more invasions in a region are associated with lower investment, and in particular a bias towards annual crops as opposed to long‐term crops. We use a county‐level dataset for the state of Paraná, Brazil, from 2003 to 2007, with 1,995 observations. The panel data structure allows us to control for fixed effects, such as the formalisation of land titles and land concentration, which might be correlated with the intensity of invasions.

The Edwards Aquifer in south-central Texas, U.S.A. is recognized worldwide for its aquatic species of flora and fauna, many of which are endangered or threatened, and also is the sole water source supporting the industrial, agricultural, municipal, and recreational needs of nearly 2 million people. Because it is generally the first species affected by low spring flows, the endangered fountain darter (Etheostoma fonticola) has been a focal point for controversies involving the endangered species act, state of Texas groundwater law, and private property rights.

Customary land and forests are more embedded in the global economy than ever. With globally significant supplies of land and raw materials and favorable terms for foreign investors, developing countries – particularly in Africa – have become increasingly attractive trade partners and destinations for investors. Increasing competition over land is placing new pressures on vast tracts of forest and woodland, areas often considered ‘under-utilized’ by national governments despite their critical role in supporting local livelihoods.

Most of the land reforms in developing countries in recent decades follow a blueprint that is based on the property rights theory. This blueprint was supported by Western government-backed development aid institutions and the World Bank and intends to achieve a capitalization of property rights on land by formalization and individualization. Its supporters expect higher efficiency of the land markets and higher tenure security. The focus of the article is not so much on the formalization efforts themselves, but on the capitalization of the use rights.