



**ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF CAADP  
IN TANZANIA AND ENGAGEMENT  
OF SMALLHOLDER FARMERS**

**FINAL REPORT**

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# Assessing Implementation of CAADP in Tanzania and Engagement of Smallholder Farmers

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background

1. Since endorsement of CAADP, various African countries have been attempting to align their programmes and implement the pillars and targets set in the CAADP framework. Tanzania signed the CAADP Compact in July 2010 and subsequently the investment plan (TAFSIP) was launched in July 2011.
2. Effective funds utilisation is only possible by adhering to one of the core principles of CAADP of stakeholders' participation. It is not clear how smallholder farmers have been involved in CAADP formulation, implementation and monitoring progress. Stakeholders interested in the welfare of smallholder farmers strongly feel that the majority of CAADP implementation initiatives are inclined towards corporate agriculture at the expense of small scale farmers who are their main targets. This raises concerns over land grabbing and increasing land related disputes.
3. Upon this understanding, MVIWATA commissioned a study to explore the issues highlighted above and recommend advocacy areas. This report is a result of that study.

### Objective of the Study

4. Specific objectives of the study included reviewing the state of implementation of CAADP in Tanzania in the context of on-going multiple development initiatives; identifying and analyse gaps on policies and frameworks related to CAADP implementation; making objective analysis of commitment of the Government of Tanzania to 2003 Maputo Declaration; and assessing engagement of small scale farmers in CAADP process in Tanzania.

### Methodology and Approach

5. The approach entailed reviewing of literature and interviewing key actors. The review involved policies and documents related to a chain of interventions in agriculture with a focus on NEPAD-CAADP framework. Personal interviews included officers from the CAADP desk officer at the Ministry of Agriculture; Agriculture Non-state Actors Forum (ANSAF), Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Policy Forum, and the Eastern & Southern Africa Farmers' Forum (ESAFF).

### Key Findings

#### ***CAADP and Multiple Agricultural Development Initiatives in Tanzania***

6. Implementation of CAADP is supposed to be achieved through local agricultural interventions for respective countries. Tanzania has had a multitude of interventions for promoting agriculture sector embedded in the Vision 2025 and MKUKUTA. There

has been a chain of overlapping multiple development initiatives in agriculture that run parallel without clearly complementing each other and with little positive impact on the livelihood of smallholder farmers.

### ***Synergy between CAADP and other agricultural development initiatives***

7. Clarification on the linkages between the multitudes of agricultural development initiatives is usually given by politicians and technocrats. Nonetheless authentic and convincing linkage is hard to come by. It is evident that the initiatives are running parallel to each other.

### ***Policy Gaps in CAADP implementation Framework (Challenges)***

8. The CAADP framework intended to complement existing national agriculture strategies and to focus on the overall development of the sector by providing supplementary inputs to bridge gaps identified in the sector policies, strategies as well as supporting scaling-up successful initiatives in the sector. Some argued that 'TAFSIP is a piece of paper on the shelf. This could have been due to its introduction in spite of so many pre existed policies with similar goals. How TAFSIP was developed in relation to pre-existing agricultural strategies and policies, remain an amazing story, because of the presence of a long list of potentially relevant official policy initiatives influencing agriculture.
9. CAADP focuses on financial and technical issues without addressing socio-economic issues and meeting the needs of rural people, in particular the needs of women. CAADP promotes the reform of African agriculture through the adoption of modern or improved technologies associated with the Green Revolution. African farmers do not need "advanced technologies" that will make them loose control of their traditional seeds and will make them dependent on inputs supplied and controlled by large multinationals and foreign suppliers. We believe that small-scale farmers traditional production methods based on traditional seeds and local inputs must instead be enhanced through research and technologies based on agro-ecological principles that can ensure that they remain independent and autonomous producers.
10. Although governments are supposed to establish CAADP country teams to coordinate CAADP processes, in Tanzania the team seems to be on papers. The team leader claims that the team is in place and consists of 42 individuals, affiliated with the ministry of agriculture, the private sector, NGOs, academia, etc; and performs its functions through working groups around investment areas. However, the individual cited as part of the team were not aware of their membership in the CAADP country team.

### ***Tanzania Government Commitment to 2003 Maputo Declaration***

11. Since 2001/02 the agricultural budget in Tanzania has generally been increasing gradually in nominal terms. When adjustment for inflation is made, the difference between nominal and real budget ranges between 4.9% (in 2002) and 49.1% in 2011. While Tanzania is struggling to reach the 10% CAADP target, some countries have made it and the impact on agricultural growth is vivid. Such countries include Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, and Niger.
  
12. Like in the previous CAADP target of 10%, the 6% annual growth rate in agriculture has not been achieved despite solid economic growth. Because of weaker performance of agriculture Tanzania has not been able to achieve significant reductions in poverty or shown some improvements in nutritional status.

### ***Engagement of Small Scale Farmers in CAADP Process in Tanzania***

13. Engagement of smallholder farmers in the CAADP process is implied in the TAFSIP document as it is claimed that the process was broad based. Interview with knowledgeable informants indicated that smallholder farmers were represented by civil society organisations. It was also argued that the ministry of agriculture sent officers in the regions to sensitize and create awareness among farmers on the new initiative. Whether smallholders are benefiting from TAFSIP stakeholders observed that it too early to tell; but it will depend on a number of factors like infrastructures, government commitment, land law reforms to protect farmers' land from land grabbing.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

14. Implementation of Maputo Declaration is a tricky thing. Countries, after signing CAADP Compacts and establishment of investment plan, are at liberty to design operational programmes. For Tanzania, operational programmes have been numerous with little or no coherence. Apart from political statements, there is no economic evidence that agricultural development programmes that are implemented in Tanzania are clearly linked to the Maputo Declaration and to each other. All in all, Tanzania has missed both targets of CAADP. The following recommendations are given:
  - Government ministries, departments and agencies should put in place clear rules to fully and transparently involve civil society networks in policy processes and dialogue. In doing so the government should recognise the difference between instrumental and symbolic involvement of stakeholders. Instrumental participation is where participation is active whereas in symbolic participation stakeholders are passive participants of the process. Instead of

inviting representatives of stakeholders, it is recommended that the draft plans should be sent to the stakeholders and be given ample time to discuss within their circles and submit comments/views to the planners.

- The government should fulfil its international commitment of allocating 10% of the national budget to the agriculture sector without excuses.
- The multitude of agricultural development programs in Tanzania should be rationalised and harmonised into one comprehensive initiative for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness.
- Political will and prioritization of agriculture is one thing, and implementation is entirely a different thing. Planning has never been a problem in this country. Tanzania has very good plans probably better than TAFSIP, but the problem has always been on the implement side. It is recommended that agricultural development programmes that are underway should be implemented in the framework of the newly established institution, the Presidential Delivery Bureau (PDB) and the Agricultural Delivery Agency the operations of which claim to be business as unusual.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADWG	Agriculture Donor Working Group
AECI	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AMSDP	Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme
ANSAF	Agriculture Non-state Actors Forum
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme
ASDP-L	Agricultural Sector Development Programme - Livestock: Support for Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Development
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASPS	Agricultural Sector Programme Support
BRN	Big Result Now
BSF	Belgium Survival Fund
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CBT	Cashewnut Board of Tanzania
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CILSS	<i>Comite permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel</i>
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DASIP	District Agricultural Sector Investment Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DGIS	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

EPZ	Export processing zones
ESAFF	Eastern & Southern Africa Farmers' Forum
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
ETG	Export Trading Group
EU	European Commission
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization
FARA	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FPRI	Foreign Policy Research Institute
GIZ	<i>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
GMO	Genetically Modified Organisms
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ILD	Institute for Liberty and Democracy
IPRs	Intellectual Property Rights
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MAFC	Ministry of agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	The Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MeTL	Mohamed Enterprises Tanzania Ltd
MKUKUTA	<i>Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini</i>
MKURABITA	Business and Property Formalization Programme (Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania)
MKUZA	<i>Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi Zanzibar</i>
MPs	Members of parliament
MVIWATA	<i>Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima</i> (Network of Farmers' Organisation)
NAIVS	National Input Voucher System
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development

NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NSA	Non-State Actors
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PADEP	Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project
PAFO	Pan African Farmers' Organization
PDB	Presidential Delivery Bureau
PPP	Public-private partnership
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
RECs	Regional economic communities
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
RFSP	Rural Financial Services Programme
RMB	Rand Merchant Bank
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SEZ	Special Economic Zones
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SUMA-JKT	<i>Shirika la Uzalishaji Mali la Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa</i>
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TNBC	Tanzania National Business Council
ToR	The Terms of Reference
UPOV	Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZPRP	Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
ZSGRP	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty

## 1. BACKGROUND

In July 2003 in Maputo, African Heads of State and Government endorsed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in the framework of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), in what has become to be known as the Maputo Declaration. The Declaration contains several important decisions regarding agriculture, but prominent among them is the commitment to the allocation of at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development policy implementation, which in turn would make the sector attain an annual growth rate of 6 percent. This was adopted as a means of reducing poverty, promoting overall economic growth and achieving the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the number of poor people by 2015.

Since endorsement of CAADP, various African countries have been attempting to align their programmes and implement the pillars and targets set in the CAADP framework. By June 2012, 40 African countries had engaged in the CAADP process, 30 had signed CAADP compacts and 23 had finalised investment plans. With regard to Tanzania, in July 2010 the United Republic of Tanzania signed the CAADP Compact becoming the 19th African country and the first in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region to have signed it. This was done after a successful CAADP roundtable conference culminating into endorsement of Tanzania's CAADP Compact. The CAADP Roundtable involving Tanzania and Zanzibar which was held on the 6th and 8th July 2010 in Dar es Salaam was attended by more than 300 participants. The draft investment plan was put in place in December 2010. Ultimately, in July 2011 the investment plan for Tanzania was launched, and has been baptised 'the Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP).

While on the one hand it is very important to meet CAADP targets so as to fast-track agricultural development across the continent, it is equally important that the funds are allocated and utilised appropriately and effectively. This is only possible by adhering to one of the core principles of CAADP of stakeholders' participation. In particular, it is not clear how smallholder farmers have been and are involved in CAADP formulation, implementation and monitoring its progress. Furthermore, although there are currently a multitude of ongoing agricultural development programmes in the country, presumably aligned to CAADP framework, stakeholders interested in the welfare of smallholder farmers strongly feel that the majority of these initiatives sideline small scale farmers who are the main target of these interventions.

Amidst these multiple initiatives on agriculture, the policy inclination in Tanzania is towards large scale farming and corporate agriculture. This raises concerns over land grabbing and increasing land disputes between large scale and smallholder farmers; the issues that are of critical interest for the Network of Farmers' Organisation (MVIWATA).

Upon this understanding, MVIWATA commissioned a study to explore the issues highlighted above and recommend advocacy areas. This report is a result of that study.

## **2. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The main objective of this study was to assess implementation of CAADP in Tanzania, especially looking on initiatives undertaken by the government after 10 years since Maputo declaration and associated changes or impact. The critical issue is involvement and participation of small scale in the CAADP process at national level.

Specific objectives include:

- (i) To review the state of implementation of CAADP in Tanzania in the context of on-going multiple initiatives.
- (ii) To identify and analyse gaps on policies and frameworks related to CAADP implementation
- (iii) To make objective analysis of commitment of the Government of Tanzania to 2003 Maputo Declaration
- (iv) To assess engagement of small scale farmers in CAADP process in Tanzania

## **3. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

There are currently mountains of documents that review the state of implementation of CAADP although not necessarily from the small scale farmer perspective. Thus, the approach centred on reviewing of existing literature and interviews of identified main actors in the CAADP circles at national level.

This section provides a detailed description of the service that the consultant offered in accomplishing this assignment. Figure 1 below summarizes the research process indicating the main activities, tasks and outputs.

### **3.1 Consultation**

At the start of the exercise, the consultant met with the client, MVIWATA in this case and agreed on the details of the research approach, familiarize with the consultant, exchange information of relevance to field visits, discuss the organization of the field visits, and agree on the details of main deliverables, and dissemination and time to start the assignment.

### **3.2 Desk Research**

The consultant reviewed policies and documents related to a chain of interventions in agriculture with a focus on NEPAD-CAADP framework in relation to country level

implementation. The desk research helped the consultant to have clear understanding of the implementation status and nature of involvement of key stakeholders in the formulation and implementation processes of CAADP. Desk research started immediately after the consultation phase and signing of the contract in which a number of reports, publications and dossiers were reviewed.

### **3.3 Field Visits**

The field visits adopted two approaches. First, was identification of key stakeholders in this assignment; this was carried out in collaboration with the client. The Terms of Reference (ToR) had already indicated some of the informants to be contacted, such as the CAADP desk officer at the Ministry of Agriculture, representatives of farmers' organisations and other stakeholders that deem important to achieve objectives of this study. Thus the consultant contacted the CAADP desk at the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC), Agriculture Non-state Actors Forum (ANSAF), Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Network of Farmers' Groups (MVIWATA), Policy Forum, and the Eastern & Southern Africa Farmers' Forum (ESAFF). Key informants were interviewed to collect information on the processes and mechanisms of CAADP formulation, implementation and synergies with other initiatives. Interview guides were used in the process of information collection (Appendices 1 and 2).


### **3.4 Analysis and Reporting**

The information collected was synthesized in line with the specific objectives of this assignment as outlined earlier. The final report cover descriptions and findings of the main project phases (desk research, field visit, analysis), including methodological issues. The consultant has produced this draft report that has been submitted to the client for reviewing and commenting. The client's views will then be incorporated into the final report.

### **3.5 Dissemination Workshops**

Key findings of this study will be presented at three different workshops to be organised by the client as per ToR. These workshops aim at sharing information with stakeholders and agree on the way forward in undertaking advocacy works for influencing policy.

**Figure 1: Assignment phases and tasks**



#### 4. CAADP CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Food security remains one of the key challenges that African countries confront today. This problem is most visibly evidenced by frequent food shortages and famines<sup>1</sup>. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 26 percent of Africa's population is undernourished. Such a figure is not only tragic, but also has devastating long-term consequences for Africa's economic development. There is a clear link, for instance, between malnourishment and poor health and low education attainment<sup>2</sup>, both important components of human capital.

Thus, for sustainable development to take root, Africa must attain food security, which should be accomplished largely through increasing its own production. Unfortunately, at present, Africa's agricultural productivity is extremely low. For instance, in 2010, the continent's cereal production was roughly 1,300 kilograms per hectare, roughly half of that of South Asia (World Bank, 2012)<sup>3</sup>. This poor performance is a result of a number of factors. First, the percentage of arable land that is irrigated in Africa is low, much smaller than an analogous percentage for Asia, 3 percent versus 47 percent (FAO, 2012)<sup>4</sup>. In addition, Africa uses less fertilizer than other regions of the globe; compare its 11 kilograms per hectare of arable land versus South Asia's 169 kilograms (World Bank, 2012). It also utilizes less machinery: In 2003, there were 1.3 tractors per hectare of arable land in the sub-Saharan region, while the Asia and the Pacific region averaged 14.9<sup>5</sup> (Box 1).

##### **Box 1: Agriculture in Tanzania is highly undercapitalised**

*In Tanzania, for example, much of agriculture takes place using land and labour, with few complementary capital investments – fertilizers, improved seed, crop protection chemicals, irrigation and drainage and machinery. For example, in a 2009 survey of households growing irrigated onions on small plots in central Tanzania, most households owned simple tools such as hoes, axes, machetes and watering cans. Few had much else: only a minority of households had sprayers; while a handful had irrigation pumps, a tractor, lorry or motorcycle. In total, the value of such assets per household was estimated at the equivalent of just US\$26 (Mutabazi et al., 2010)*

<sup>1</sup> Such as the crisis in the Horn of Africa that lasted from July 2011 to February 2012 and impacted some 13 million people.

<sup>2</sup> Jamison DT, Breman JG, Measham AR, et al., editors. Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries. 2nd edition. World Bank; 2006.

<sup>3</sup> World Development Indicators. The World Bank (2012)

<sup>4</sup> FAO 2012. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012. Food security indicators

<sup>5</sup> Ashburner and Kienzle, 2011. Investment in agricultural mechanization in Africa: Conclusions and recommendations of a Round Table Meeting of Experts. Agricultural and Food Engineering Technical Report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, 2011

The African Union (AU) has recognized the challenges these factors and low agricultural productivity present to the long-term development of the continent. In the AU's Second Ordinary Assembly held in July of 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique, African heads of state ratified an initiative called the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). The program, part of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), was endorsed as a framework meant to create ambitious institutional and policy transformation in the agriculture sector. The explicit goal of CAADP is to "eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. In pursuit of this aim, African governments committed to two "targets." The first is to achieve 6 percent annual growth in agricultural productivity by 2015. The second was to increase the allocation of national budgets directed to the agricultural sector to at least 10 percent. CAADP also has four stated pillars, which are:

- Pillar 1: Extending the area under sustainable land and water management
- Pillar 2: Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access
- Pillar 3: Increasing food supply and reducing hunger
- Pillar 4: Agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption

The process by which these pillars support what could be thought of as the heart of CAADP, the country-level process, which has three core elements as follows:

- Firstly, stock-taking which is a process whereby relevant stakeholders analyze current and previous agricultural conditions, especially as they relate to the pillar issues;
- The secondly part are roundtable discussions in which broad arrays of actors are assembled to explore and agree upon ways to further the agricultural development agenda. This part of the process culminates in the signing of a CAADP compact, essentially an agreement of consensually identified priorities and a roadmap to implement the country's strategy for agricultural development. Reflecting CAADP's emphasis on creating consensus among a wide range of actors, the compact is signed by a number of key stakeholders. Tanzania's compact, for instance, was signed by two of the country's ministers, representatives from the African Union, the World Bank, civil society, agricultural associations, the private sector, etc.
- The third and final part of the process is the preparation and implementation of country investment plans, which puts the CAADP compact into effect. For Tanzania, the investment plan is referred to as Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP). The investment plan defines the roles of stakeholders, estimates the costs of executing certain actions and identifies sources of funding. However, it should be noted that CAADP is, by design, flexible:

each country generates its own compact and investment plan to achieve its own stated goals. CAADP's philosophy is not one that calls for a "one size fits all" approach.

Finally, CAADP requires that country-level activities are replicated on a regional basis, with each of Africa's Regional economic communities undertaking stock-taking processes and ultimately executing compacts and investment plans for agricultural development priorities occurring across their member states.

Apart from these processes, there are other opportunities for stakeholders to convene and improve upon the CAADP framework. There is the CAADP-Africa Forum, which brings together non-state-actors to review the CAADP progress, and the Partnership Platform, which is a more formal body for CAADP implementers to coordinate responsibilities. The number of actors involved in the CAADP process is large, and lines of responsibility frequently adapt to the needs of the specific national contexts and country priorities. A CAADP official core document entitled *Accelerating CAADP Country Implementation: A Guide for Implementers* accentuates this issue (Box 2).

**Box 2: The boundaries and mandates on CAADP implementation**

*"... The boundaries and mandates (governing roles and responsibilities on CAADP implementation) are fluid and task-oriented rather than cemented into fixed structures ... the clarification of roles and responsibilities are evolving and may change over time and in different countries and regions, according to who is best placed to do the work".*

By this notion, ideally CAADP decision-making should be as localized as practically possible. In other words, large actors like the African Union and NEPAD should not exert too heavy a hand in creating policy especially given the emphasis the program places on local priorities and solutions. Due to this principle, the main players, listed below, play varied roles.

- The CAADP Country Team takes the lead in managing and coordinating the country-level process. Its membership is appointed by the national government and, ideally, should strongly support it. Typically, the team is representative as it is drawn from a wide spectrum of stakeholders. In Tanzania the team consists of 42 individuals, affiliated with the ministry of agriculture, the private sector, NGOs, academia<sup>6</sup>, etc although some institutions are not aware that they are represented. It was noted that even the client of this assignment, MVIWATA, is

<sup>6</sup> Sokoine University of Agriculture is said to be represented by Prof. Amon Mattee from the Department of Agricultural Education and Extension and Prof. Andrew Temu from the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness. However both were not aware that they are members of the CAADP team.

part of the country team without his knowledge. The team is tasked with garnering political support for CAADP, collecting information for the “stock-taking” aspect of the process, encouraging the engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, disseminating information on the process, etc. Discussion with the team leader, Ms. Magreth Ndaba suggested that the team is in place and performing its function through working groups around investment areas. Members meet occasionally when there is an issue to discuss.

- Separate from the CAADP country team is the Agriculture Donor Working Group (ADWG), which is tasked with coordinating donor input at the country-level and liaising with the national groups. The ADWG is not operational in all CAADP countries. None of these units, however, are meant to be a substitute for any government agencies. Nor is the CAADP process meant to run parallel with and be held separate from the political system in the country. Rather, ideally, the CAADP process generally should work within such a system and in the process, complement and improve it.
- Stakeholders at the national level—representatives from NGOs, the private sector, farmers associations, etc.—also play an important role in the CAADP process. They provide input in the drafting of the national compact and the investment plan that reflects their own perspectives and agendas. It should be noted that what is presented under this section is an ideal condition on how CAADP framework should be. Each country is at different stage in implementing CAADP processes.
- Pillar institutions - there are four “pillar institutions” one for each pillar that supports the country-level process. These institutions provide expertise and technical guidance in the form of economic analysis, reviews of current public expenditure or studies of options policymakers have on any given decision.
  - The University of Zambia, and particularly its department of soil science, and the *Comite permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS)*, a research organization that combats food insecurity in the Sahel, leads Pillar 1, providing CAADP stakeholders with guidance on sustainable land and water management.
  - The Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa—a collection of ministers from 20 African countries—leads Pillar 2 and its initiatives relating to market access through improved rural infrastructure and other trade-related interventions.
  - The University of Kwa Zulu Natal, and particularly the School of Agriculture, Earth and Environmental Sciences, as well as CILSS lead Pillar 3 on issues relating to food security, smallholder productivity and responses to food emergencies.

- Finally, the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, an umbrella body of regional agricultural research organizations, leads Pillar 4 on agricultural research.

Performing similar roles of these institutions are other supporting organizations including the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). ReSAKSS is located throughout Africa, with particular centers of operation in West, Southern, and Central/East Africa. This group produces high-level technical assistance for CAADP implementers, including its Annual Trends and Outlook Report, which examines rates of agricultural growth across the continent, supporting efforts to achieve CAADP goals and objectives. NEPAD and the African Union have also contributed support in many different ways, including knowledge management and information sharing across the program and amongst its stakeholders.

- Funding - for each of these institutions come from a range of sources. Regional economic communities (RECs) interact with and address the needs of member states participating in the CAADP process as they arise. In particular, they have “monitoring and evaluation” duties, in which they conduct reviews of CAADP’s streamlining of member states’ policy processes. They raise awareness of the program and encourage political leadership to engage with it. Perhaps most importantly, and as discussed above, the RECs work to draft (and coordinate implementation of) the regional compacts and investment plans, which deal with issues that are trans-national in nature, e.g. trade between member states, multinational infrastructure projects, and trans-boundary water management. (At the continental level, the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) promote the exchange of information regarding “best practices” between countries and, like the RECs, conduct monitoring and evaluation studies and reviews. It also identifies areas where additional funding is necessary and creates partnerships with donors to secure such funding. Complementing NPCA in these roles is the African Union Commission, which predominantly works to garner political endorsement and international support for CAADP.
- Finally, donor support is used to fund the process itself (roundtables, monitoring and evaluation studies, preparation and technical review of investment plans, etc.) as well as the projects envisioned by CAADP investment plans. Bilateral assistance comes from a range of actors, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).

- CAADP also receives multilateral assistance. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), a mechanism operated through the World Bank, is charged with building capacity of CAADP institutions and funding its processes (World Bank, 2012 b). For now, the fund has six donors (USAID, the European Commission and the governments of the Netherlands, Ireland, France and Britain) which have committed \$50 million, of which \$35 million has been disbursed. The recipients of this aid to date—which is given through mechanisms known as child trust funds— have been the AU Commission, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa and two RECs: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will soon be added to this list as they have recently applied for such funds and been granted these requests. Altogether, these institutions have been officially granted \$17 million, of which approximately \$5.5 million has been disbursed<sup>7</sup>.

Though the donors play an important role in the program, their participation is not supposed to obscure the fact that CAADP strives to be explicitly “Africa-owned”, and, as such, reflects the visions of African leaders and farmers.

## 5. KEY FINDINGS

### 5.1 CAADP and Multiple Agricultural Development Initiatives in Tanzania

Implementation of CAADP is supposed to be achieved through local agricultural interventions for respective countries. Tanzania has had a multitude of interventions for promoting agriculture sector embedded in Vision 2025. Thus, this section could be explored adequately by examining two aspects, namely (1) agricultural development initiatives in Tanzania, and (2) the interface between CAADP and local agricultural development initiatives. This kind of conceptualization enables capturing CAADP implementation in Tanzania as demanded by the first specific objective of this assignment.

#### 5.1.1 *Agricultural development initiatives in Tanzania*

Creating conducive environment for agricultural transformation in Tanzania has been the focus of the government especially in the last decade. As stated earlier on, the overall development framework is the Vision 2025. Under this vision, there have been a series of initiatives comprised of programs and projects. The most prominent ones are covered under this section while indicating opportunities in each of them. They include Mini-tiger plan 2020; National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR)

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<sup>7</sup> NEPAD Agency. 2011. 2011 Annual Report.

colloquially known as *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikni* (MKUKUTA) for Tanzania Mainland and MKUZA for Zanzibar; Property and Business Formalisation Program, known as *Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania* (MKURABITA); Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and its implementation program, the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP); Agriculture First (*Kilimo Kwanza*); Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT); 5-Year Development Plan 2011-2016; and the recently inaugurated one, the Big Result Now (BRN).

Critical examination reveals that small-scale farmers are supposed to be at the centre of these initiatives. Zeal such as ensuring food self-sufficiency and food security; reducing income poverty; improving standards of living in the rural areas; supplying raw materials, improving production and productivity, improving marketing and processing technologies; etc. are strongly indicated in these initiatives.

#### **5.1.1.1 National Vision 2025**

The National Vision 2025, formulated by the Government under the auspices of the Planning Commission and adopted in 1999, spells out Tanzania's long-term development vision. It outlines five main attributes that Tanzania is expected to have attained by the year 2025, namely (i) a high quality livelihood; (ii) peace, stability and national unity; (iii) good governance; (iv) a well educated and learning society imbued with an ambition to develop; and (v) a competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits. It envisages Tanzania's graduation from a least developed into a middle income country, having eliminated abject poverty and maintaining a high economic growth rate of at least 8 percent per annum. The Vision 2025 furthermore identifies basic pillars for its successful implementation, including the need for a competitive development mindset as well as a culture of self-reliance in Tanzanian society. It includes implementation guidelines, relating among others to the importance of undertaking reviews and reforms of existing laws and institutional structures as well as of people's participation in preparing and implementing plans for their own development.

#### **5.1.1.2 Zanzibar Vision 2020**

Various strategies have subsequently been formulated in line with the National Vision 2025. In addition to the National Vision 2025, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has formulated a Zanzibar Vision 2020, which is Zanzibar's long-term plan for eradicating absolute poverty and attaining overall sustainable human development. Zanzibar Vision 2020 envisages that, by the year 2020, Zanzibar will have eradicated abject poverty, developed a strong, diversified and competitive economy; it will have maintained peace, political stability, good governance and national unity. The Zanzibar Vision also elaborates a range of broad policy objectives.

### **5.1.1.3 National Poverty Eradication Strategy**

At the same time as it was preparing National Vision 2025, the Government developed a National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) as a long-term strategy for poverty reduction. It is linked to the National Vision and provides a guiding framework for coordinating and supervising the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies and strategies for poverty eradication in order to reduce absolute poverty by the year 2025. The NPES identifies areas of strategic interventions, relating to the creation of an enabling environment for poverty eradication. Objectives identified in the National Vision and the NPES are largely compatible and continue to inform the policies of the Fourth Phase Government of President Kikwete, who won the December 2005 elections and succeeded President Mkapa, and was reelected again in the 2010 elections. Continued committed to implementing the Vision together with the *Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)* was among others expressed in the CCM Party's 2005 and 2010 Election Manifestos.

### **5.1.1.4 Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan**

Tanzania's first medium-term Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,<sup>8</sup> which was drawn up in 2000 in the context of the enhanced HIPC Initiative, covering an implementation period of three years from 2000/01 to 2002/03. Guided by Tanzania's National Vision 2025 and the NPES, the PRS elaborated objectives and interventions for poverty reduction in seven priority sectors, namely (i) basic education, (ii) primary health, (iii) water, (iv) rural roads, (v) judiciary, (vi) agriculture research and extension, and (vii) HIV/AIDS. Zanzibar formulated its own Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP) for the implementation of the Zanzibar Vision 2020. The Plan had a three-year span, from 2002 to 2005, and focused on reducing income poverty, improving human capabilities, survival and social well-being, and containing extreme vulnerability through selected priority areas of health, water, agriculture, infrastructure, especially rural roads, HIV/AIDS and good governance.

### **5.1.1.5 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty**

Following a comprehensive review of the first PRS and the publication of a third PRS Progress Report in January 2004, the Government of Tanzania formulated the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), also known under the Swahili acronym MKUKUTA, as Tanzania's second-generation PRS in order to continue moving toward the achievement of the objectives of the National Vision 2025 and the MDGs. The MKUKUTA was approved by the Cabinet in February 2005 for implementation over five years (2005/06–09/10), starting in July 2005.

The strategy was set up in three clusters, each with main goals, pinned out with targets and means to reach them. The cluster that is relevant to the context of this study is

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<sup>8</sup> The Government completed the PRS in October 2000 and PRS Progress Reports in August 2001, March 2003 and April 2004.

Cluster I which covers issues related to growth and reduction of income poverty. Cluster I has six goals as follows: ensuring sound economic management; promoting sustainable and broad-based growth; improved food availability and accessibility at household level in urban and rural areas; reducing income poverty of both men and women in rural areas; and reducing income poverty of both men and women in urban areas. Critical examination reveals that these objectives affect the lives of smallholder farmers in a direct way. This is because about 75% of the population in Tanzania lives in rural areas working on the farm to earn livelihood. Whether the livelihood of the farmers has improved in the reference period is a contentious issue. Phase I of MKUKUTA has been concluded in 2010, and Phase II has just started.

#### ***5.1.1.6 Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty***

The successor of the ZPRP, the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP), or MKUZA in Swahili, also adopts an outcome-based approach around three clusters: (i) growth and reduction of income poverty; (ii) social services and well being; and (iii) good governance and national unity. It emphasizes cross-sector collaboration and inter-sector linkages and synergies. The MKUZA will be implemented for four years, from 2006/07 to 2009/10, to coincide with the implementation cycle of the MKUKUTA.

#### ***5.1.1.7 Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020***

To fast track progress toward achieving the National Vision 2025, in 2005 the Government completed a Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020, which fed into the MKUKUTA. The Mini-Tiger Plan aims at fostering competitiveness of Tanzanian products on the global markets and promoting exports, including through the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Export processing zones (EPZ). Specifically on agriculture, the Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 proposes a 'One Village-One Product' strategy, which had hitherto never been adopted.

#### ***5.1.1.8 Business and Property Formalization Programme***

In order to give impetus to the development initiatives that were underway, Tanzania formulated the Business and Property Formalization Programme (MKURABITA) that is implemented by the Tanzanian Government in partnership with Hernando de Soto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD). The formalization programme builds on de Soto's well known hypothesis that the most effective way to empower the poor is to provide them with formalized rights to their property. However, one of the critical features of the formalisation programme, particularly as they relate to the needs and challenges faced by the poor is that the formalization programme builds on a highly theoretical understanding of formalisation and that the analytic groundwork that has been done has failed to capture the political economy of change. It is suggested that to support the organic development of formalization in a manner that will indeed empower the poor, much more groundwork needs to be done to ensure that formalisation will not weaken rather than strengthen the poor's rights to their land (Sundet, 2008).

### ***5.1.1.9 Agricultural Sector Development Strategy***

In order to put into operation the Agricultural and Livestock Development Policy of 1997, the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) was formulated by the Government in 2001, to provide a framework for directing public and private resources into the sector, and for eventually contributing to the objective of growth and poverty reduction. The ASDS objectives are to improve agricultural productivity and profitability in order to raise farm incomes, to reduce rural poverty and achieve greater food security. The ASDS identifies five strategic issues: (i) strengthening the institutional framework; (ii) creating a favourable environment for commercial activities; (iii) clarifying public and private sector roles in improving support services; (iv) strengthening marketing efficiency for inputs and outputs; and (v) mainstreaming planning for agricultural development in other sectors.

### ***5.1.1.10 Agricultural Sector Development Programme***

Following the broad consensus around the ASDS, the government, together with donors, formulated the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), which was financed through a basket funding arrangement. The programme aimed at: (i) improving the capacity of farmers to more clearly articulate demand for agricultural services and to build partnership with service providers; (ii) reforming and improving capacity of both public and private agricultural service providers to respond to demand and provide appropriate advice, services and technologies; (iii) improving the quality and quantity of public investment in physical infrastructure through more devolved, technically-sound planning and appraisal, and (iv) improving market institutions. In addition, the government, together with donors, has implemented several other programmes, including the Participatory Agricultural Development Programme (PADEP), District Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (DASIP), and Agricultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS). Since then a number of projects have been and still being implemented. Apart from ASDP, there have been several interventions closely linked to ASDP but running parallel to ASDP. These are summarised in Table 1 below.

### ***5.1.1.11 Agriculture First (Kilimo Kwanza)***

However, during the implementation stakeholders realised that ASDP was not inclusive enough. This may be looked at as a claim to justify over-privatisation in agric sector; and the result is opposite where smallholder farmers now feel alienated from initiatives created after ASDP. Large scale farmers, who form about 10% of the farming population in the country were either not part of the program or were feebly implied in it. To address this anomaly, Agriculture First (Kilimo Kwanza) was conceptualised. According to the information available from Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC), Kilimo Kwanza is a national resolve to accelerate agricultural transformation. It comprises a holistic set of policy instruments and strategic interventions towards addressing various sectoral challenges and taking advantage of the numerous opportunities to modernise and commercialise agriculture in Tanzania.

**Table 1: Other agricultural initiatives running parallel to ASDP**

<b>Programme</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Total cost (US \$ million)</b>	<b>Source of fund (Million US\$)</b>	<b>Target households (beneficiaries)</b>
Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP)	2001 - 2010	23.8	IFAD Loan (19.5); IFAD grant (0.45); OPEC (2.2); Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (2.2)	55,000
Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP)	2002 – 2009	52.8	IFAD Loan (16.3); African Development Fund (AfDF) (25.0); Development cooperation Ireland (1.1); Deficit (4.5)	25,000
Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)	2006 - 2013	190.1	IFAD Loan (56.0); Basket Fund (89.7 Deficit (9.2)	1,489,320
Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programme	2007 – 2014	25.3	IFAD Loan (19.5); IFAD grant (0.45); Development cooperation Ireland (0.9)	23 districts
Agricultural Sector Development Programme - Livestock: Support for Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Development (AMDP-L)	2007 - 2015	29.1	IFAD Loan (20.6); Belgium Survival Fund for 3 <sup>rd</sup> World (BSF) (4.8)	460,839
Agricultural Services Support Programme (ASSP)	2007 – 2014	114.4	IFAD Loan (25.0); Basket Fund (72.7)	549,842
Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF)	2000 – 2004	60.0	World Bank loan	40 districts
Tanzania Social Action Fund II (TASAF II)	2010 – 2015	35.0	World Bank loan	121 districts

**Source:** Extracted from different source documents

President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete launched Kilimo Kwanza in Dodoma on 3rd August 2009, as a central pillar in achieving the country's Vision 2025 and a force to propel the realisation of the Nation's socio-economic development goals. It is argued that Kilimo Kwanza is a catalyst for the implementation of Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and accelerates implementation and achievement of MDGs targets and objectives with a stronger emphasis for pro – poor growth. The implementation of Kilimo Kwanza revolves around ten pillars as indicated in the box below.

**Box 3: Ten pillars of Kilimo Kwanza**

1. *Political will to push our agricultural transformation.*
2. *Enhanced financing for agriculture.*
3. *Institutional reorganization and management of agriculture.*
4. *Paradigm shift to strategic agricultural production.*
5. *Land availability for agriculture.*
6. *Incentives to stimulate investments in agriculture.*
7. *Industrialization for agricultural transformation.*
8. *Science, technology and human resources to support agricultural transformation.*
9. *Infrastructure Development to support agricultural transformation.*
10. *Mobilization of Tanzanians to support and participate in the implementation of Kilimo Kwanza.*

It is said that since Kilimo Kwanza was launched, there has been some improvements in the performance of the agricultural sector. Examples cited include:

- the share of budget for agriculture has risen to about 7 percent of the annual budget, which has also led to increased subsidies to farmers.
- The Government has arranged a special window for concessionary lending for agricultural production at TIB, while procedures of establishing an Agricultural Bank are underway.
- The government has established a Task Force to review fiscal and non – fiscal policies to attract more investors in the agricultural sector.
- Most agricultural equipment have been exempted from taxation.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether these achievements are really due to Kilimo Kwanza as such. Since Kilimo Kwanza was coined, there has been a tendency to associate everything in agriculture with Kilimo Kwanza despite the fact that almost all the milestones in the Kilimo Kwanza dossier have been or are in the process of being missed as exemplified in Appendix 3. Arguments of Kilimo Kwanza proponents are presented in Box 4.

**Box 4: Arguments in favour of Kilimo Kwanza**

1. *It is a private sector initiative*
2. *There is strong political will*
3. *Holistic - all agric sub-sectors and ministries required to align their budgets on the Vision*
4. *It's a home grown initiative*
5. *Will be funded from internal sources*
6. *The timing is appropriate – renewed interest in agric for development partners (DPs).*

Critiques of Kilimo Kwanza point out the following

**Box 5: Arguments against Kilimo Kwanza**

1. *Formulation process of Kilimo Kwanza was not inclusive enough*
2. *Kilimo Kwanza is at high level, thus cannot be implemented without narrowing it down*
3. *Kilimo Kwanza has no novelty; it is like old wine in a new bottle*
4. *Political willingness is questionable*
5. *Whether the mindset is right for implementation of Kilimo Kwanza*

**5.1.1.12 Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT).**

Based on the criticism above, there have been efforts to design initiatives for implementing Kilimo Kwanza. One of the initiatives is establishment of the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) is an international public-private partnership launched at the World Economic Forum on Africa in May 2010 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Its mandate is to mobilise private sector investments and partnership to help achieve the goals of Tanzania's Kilimo Kwanza Vision. SAGCOT is an exclusive, multi-stakeholder partnership to rapidly develop the agricultural potential in the regions of Coast, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, and Rukwa. The founding partners include large scale farmers/ agri-business, the Government of Tanzania and companies from across the private sector from in and outside the country.

It is claimed that SAGCOT's objective is to foster inclusive, commercially successful agribusinesses that will benefit the region's small-scale farmers, and in so doing, improve the food security, reduce rural poverty and ensure environmental sustainability. The risk-sharing model of a public-private partnership (PPP) approach has been demonstrated to be successful in achieving these goals and SAGCOT marks the first PPP of such a scale in Tanzania's agricultural history. The corridor concept developed by SAGCOT aims to link the central infrastructure 'spine' of road and rail (running from the port of Dar es Salaam through Morogoro, Iringa and Mbeya to DRC, Malawi and Zambia to targeted areas of high agricultural potential (the Clusters). In this way a focused, efficient critical mass of commercial farming and agri-business can be developed. The outcomes of SAGCOT by 2030 are expected to be:

- 350,000 hectares put in profitable production, serving regional and international markets.
- Tens of thousands of smallholders becoming commercial farmers, with access to irrigation and weather insurance.
- At least 420,000 new employment opportunities created in the agricultural value chain.
- More than two million people permanently lifted out of poverty.
- Annual value of farming revenues to reach US\$1.2 billion, and
- Assured Regional food security.

SAGCOT is expected to operate in six clusters namely Kilombero, Mbarali, Ihemi, Rudewa, Sumbawanga, and Rufiji, The potentials for each cluster is presented in Appendix 5.

#### ***5.1.1.13 Five Year Development Plan***

In 2011 the government unveiled a formal Five Year Development Plan spanning from 2011/12 to 2015/16. In the introductory remarks of the plan document, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete states that Plan is the formal implementation tool of the country's development agenda, articulated in the Tanzania Development Vision 2025. The Plan is underpinned by specific strategies to fast-track realization of the Vision 2025 goals and objectives. These include sustainable and effective utilization of existing human and natural capital; creation of an enabling environment for the private sector to invest and participate in a wide range of business opportunities, in the next five years. The Plan emphasizes that the success of the private sector in tapping the advantages from the enabling environment will depend on an efficient, well functioning and effective public sector. In this respect, the Plan indicates key functions and strategies for the public sector to implement in order to render the growth momentum possible. The Plan also provides insights into responses of the government to the increasing challenges of development; and outlines what it will take to succeed, and the expected outcomes in delivering sustainable development. The document was endorsed by the parliament and became effective 2011. But in the 2012/12 and 2013/14 there was an outcry from members of

parliament (MPs) that the government budgets do not reflect pillars of the development plan.

#### ***5.1.1.14 The ‘Big Results Now (BRN)’***

This year The ‘Big Results Now (BRN)’ initiative has been launched. This initiative has been designed to translate high-level plans into actual results borrowing experience from Malaysia. The initiative is a result of an intensive ‘lab’ environment that fostered a ‘business unusual environment by encouraging lab participants to:


(i) *prioritize* because most initiatives often fail because they try to do everything for everybody (ii) *get specific* in the sense that solution must be specific enough to create a detailed roadmap, and (iii) *build a ‘three-feet’ implementation plan* understanding that a plan, even if very prescriptive in its solution, will likely not be implemented unless a detailed roadmap are identified of exactly what elements need to be done, when they will be done and whose neck will be on the line to ensure their implementation. To make sure creates a difference; Presidential Delivery Bureau (PDB) and Agriculture Delivery Agency have been created. These institutions are tasked to monitor and ensure that plans are implemented to the letter. It is too early to judge whether by BRN Tanzania has pressed the button that it has missed for decades.

#### ***5.1.2 Synergy between CAADP and other agricultural development initiatives***

Sorting out the interface between the multitudes of initiatives presented above and CAADP would probably require extra ordinary larger celebra. Clarifications on the linkages between these initiatives are usually given by politicians and technocrats. Nonetheless authentic and convincing linkage is hard to come by. It suffices to say that the initiatives are usually running parallel.

The TAFSIP document states that the initiative is not a new agricultural development strategy or programme. It is a sector-wide plan for coordinating and harmonising the resources needed to accelerate implementation of existing initiatives and to launch new initiatives which address national, regional and sectoral development priorities. It is argued that TAFSIP will be the financing mechanism and framework for the implementation of ASDP and ASP for the Mainland and Zanzibar respectively, and for emerging sectoral development initiatives on the Mainland which will be incorporated in the ASDP. In so doing, the plan is anchored to, and aligned with Tanzania’s social and economic development aspirations as expressed in Vision 2025 (for the Mainland) and Vision 2020 (for Zanzibar) together with a number of key policy and strategic statements including. To put TAFSIP into context, the following diagram (Figure 2) has been use.

Figure 2: Position of the TAFSIP in the national planning hierarchy



Source: TAFSIP

## 5.2 Policy Gaps in CAADP implementation Framework (Challenges)

The CAADP framework is intended to complement existing national agriculture strategies and frameworks and to focus on the overall development of the sector by providing complimentary and supplementary inputs to bridge gaps identified in the sector policies, strategies as well as supporting scaling-up successful initiatives in the sector. Some argued that 'TAFSIP is a piece of paper on the shelf. This could have been due to its introduction in spite of so many pre existed policies with similar goals. How TAFSIP was developed in relation to pre-existing agricultural strategies and policies, remain an amazing story, because of the presence of a long list of potentially relevant official policy initiatives influencing agriculture includes: Vision 2025, the MKUKUTA (Tanzania's PRSP), and the recently published 5-year plan and other potentially relevant policies such as

trade and regional integration, transport, gender, formalisation/land titling and local government (Cooksey, 2012).

Tanzania was one of the later CAADP Compact signatories. During 2009, nine African countries signed compacts and a further 19 countries signed in 2010 before Tanzania [[www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php](http://www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php)]. It is difficult to assess the impact of CAADP on agricultural spending policy, which seems to have followed the election cycle rather than the CAADP 10 percent target. Tanzania's relatively slow uptake of CAADP after facilitating finance became available from 2008 suggests that there were no urgent financial imperatives to embrace a new externally sourced agricultural strategy. The emergence of a proto-national commercial farming lobby challenging the MAFS's dominance of agricultural policy prompted the official adoption of KK (mid-2008). One problem the analyst faces is to explain how the ruling elite conceived of KK as a vote-winning initiative for the 2010 elections, when the more pro-smallholder policy was clearly the ASDP (and by extension CAADP-TAFSIP). KK virtually relegates the small farm household to out-growers and contract farmers.

CAADP focuses on financial and technical issues without addressing socio-economic issues and meeting the needs of rural people, in particular the needs of women. Its framework is contrary to the findings of UN International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD). The IAASTD found that industrial agriculture (energy and chemical intensive, promoting monocultures and plantations) is not suited for the needs of the 21st Century in Africa it damages land, drains and pollutes water systems, undermines bio- and ecological diversity and harms the production of food produce (vegetables, herbs, fruits) most of which are cultivated by women (Cardoso,12).

Questions behind scene: Does the evidence emerging substantiate this "African ownership" of CAADP? Are CAADP and African agricultural policies fulfilling CAADP's goals of addressing poverty, hunger and food insecurity on the continent? Who will benefit from the agriculture reform of Africa envisaged by CAADP? Who is likely to be excluded? Are CAADP processes receptive to the needs of small scale farmers and food producers, particularly women, and landless people? Do CAADP processes offer any potential opportunities to these marginalised groups? What are the potential limitations and threats? And what are some of the challenges for these marginalized groups to strengthen their voices and ensure that their concerns and demands are heard?

CAADP promotes the reform of African agriculture through the adoption of modern or improved technologies associated with the Green Revolution. These new technologies include new external inputs such as hybrid seeds, genetically modified (GM) seeds and the associated agro-chemicals (fertilisers and pesticides). 'These technologies create new markets for external inputs, credit, construction, training, research, and opportunities for the accumulation of large profits by those controlling these technologies, including

through the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). African farmers do not need “advanced technologies” that will make them lose control of their traditional seeds and will make them dependent on inputs supplied and controlled by large multinationals and foreign suppliers. We believe that small-scale farmers traditional production methods based on traditional seeds and local inputs must instead be enhanced through research and technologies based on agroecological principles that can ensure that they remain independent and autonomous producers. Despite commitments to invest 10% of national budgets, most African governments are reportedly only investing 3-6%.

Besides the forced cuts on investments in agriculture in the 1980's, imposed on impoverished and indebted countries by the international financing institutions through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and the WTO's heavy restrictions on Africa to subsidise its farmers, African farmers have also been neglected by their own governments. For example between 2000 and 2008, with the exception of Mauritius, they have spent more on the military (\$15 billion) than on agriculture (\$3 billion - UNDP 2012: Africa Human Development Report 2012 – Towards a Food Secure Future). Rather than military spending, African governments must prioritise investments in agriculture and the welfare of African people (Cardoso, 12).

Through CAADP African states are instead now promoting public-private partnerships (PPPs) between the state, the private sector and development donors and charitable institutions (e.g. the Rockefeller and the Bill Gates Foundations). They rely on attracting quality Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), with promises of best returns and risk reduction on agricultural investments. The “donors” of CAADP are organised in the Donor Platform for Rural Development. This platform created the CAADP Task Team, consisting mainly of representatives of (listed alphabetically): Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID); African Development Bank (AfDB); France – in West Africa; CIDA (Canada); DFID (UK); the European Commission (EU); FAO (UN Food and Agricultural Organisation); Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI); Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; GTZ (Germany, now known as GIZ); SIDA (Sweden); USAID (mainly through the Feed the Future Initiative); World Bank (Actionaid, 2011). To attract these FDIs African states have to develop and manage institutions and policies that favour investors, including the harmonisation of agricultural and trade policies to make it easier for capital to circulate and export its profits. Harmonisation of trade and agricultural policies will benefit large investors who will be extracting, accumulating and exporting profits at the expense and exclusion of small-scale African traders and producers. Harmonisation of seed laws protected by IPR, for example, will privatise any improved seeds that have in fact been developed based on the knowledge developed and accumulated by our ancestors through thousands of years. We believe that farmers must be free to benefit from any new knowledge through open access technologies, and be able to use, reuse, improve, exchange and sell any traditional or improved seed varieties (Cardoso, 12).

CAADP implementation followed the internal political dynamics. Tanzanian agricultural policy ownership has been embraced by Tanzania's ruling elite who embraces both state- and market-led agricultural policies. The policies under review tend towards pro-state leadership of agricultural investments (ASDP/TAFSIP) or privilege the private sector as the key to agricultural development (KILIMO KWANZA/SAGCOT). A neo-liberal strategy to attract FDI has been in place since the 1990s. Yet, during the 2000s, the GoT passed numerous laws re-empowering crop marketing boards and cooperatives. Most of the ruling elite and aspiring elite in opposition parties supported these initiatives, which capture agricultural rents from private middlemen. At the same time, members of the elite and their families have individual interests in commercial agriculture, seeking to profit from PPPs with foreign investors. But state capacity to promote private sector competition and policy coordination is undermined by the informal influence of individual trading companies and cartels, as well as the elite's own cronyist tendencies. Depending on context, therefore, members of the ruling elite can be seen to support contradictory policy positions: collectively largely pro-state, individually pro-market, at least in theory. On this reading, it is quite possible for the elite to endorse both the ASDP/TAFSIP and KK/SAGCOT, albeit to discrete audiences. Policy 'ownership' is therefore a highly contextual and contingent matter. One cannot identify unambiguous interest groups since elite members 'straddle' different and contradictory interests (Cooksey, 2013).

The sudden emergence of Kilimo Kwanza in 2009 challenged the autonomy that the MAFC enjoyed in initiating agricultural policy, particularly during the '00s. Critical members of the ruling elite and the donor community would like to see the MAFC permanently demoted from its key policy-making and implementation roles, given its poor performance record and the growing cost of cooperative losses to the Treasury. The reduction of aid resources allocated to the MAFC bureaucracy that may result from the current reconfiguration of the aid relationship threatens to further weaken MAFC's policy bargaining position.

The other side of this trend is the commitment of aid to NAFSN and to (the KK-inspired) SAGCOT. Lending agencies may begin to focus more finance on private investors than on government, while bilaterals support their respective MNCs. Loans and grants for targeted rural infrastructure could increase. New financial players, including venture funds, are joining the mix, for better or worse. Given the inertia inherent in large bureaucracies, however, it may be some time before donor support for the MAFC and other agriculture-relevant ministries falls off significantly.

Empirical evidence of the effects of the continuing 'state versus market' contradiction on agricultural policy is the ASDP/CAADP/TAFSIP versus KILIMO KWANZA/SAGCOT. President Kikwete (2005-15) has a high profile in African agricultural policy circles, where he is perceived to be sympathetic to large-scale foreign investment. In meetings of the GEF and investment promotion fora worldwide, Mr. Kikwete has consistently promoted the KK vision yet, he also vacillates between 'pro-state' and 'pro-market' policy positions.

On chairing In the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) meeting that launched Kilimo Kwanza on June 2009, President Kikwete, opened the meeting instead of endorsing KK; he railed against exploitative businessmen by saying “their days are numbered”, and singled out the ASDP for analysing “why Tanzania’s agriculture is backward and what needs to be done. What remains is doing what is envisaged in the programme” Mr Kikwete cited the irrigation, fertiliser and improved seeds components of ASDP, but did not mention Kilimo Kwanza (Nungwe, 2009).

It was left to President Karume of Zanzibar to praise the team of home-grown experts which drew up Kilimo Kwanza, insisting that The Kilimo Kwanza programme can be implemented. By the end of the two-day meeting, which endorsed TNBC’s proposals for taking KK forward, Kikwete was exhorting TNBC members to “Take up this initiative. Do not wait for the government... If we had one million acres under large-scale farms, we could do wonders. Invest in large-scale farming” he is quoted as saying ‘leave the small scale farmers to the government while you plan for your own’ Creating centers of excellence can attract president Obama’s government support’ (Ambali, 2009). Moreover, Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda embraced KK with enthusiasm, referring to it as his ‘bible’, though implementing KK required abandoning “our negative mindset”, a theme raised initially by President Karume referring to the old fashioned mindset (Ambali, 2009). However, over the sudden, agricultural modernity is associated with large-scale, mechanised farming, not uplifting the smallholder/peasant through research, extension, inputs and credit.

During the subsequent parliamentary budget session in Dodoma nearly every minister regurgitated the catchphrase ‘Kilimo Kwanza’ when discussing the new budget’ leading critics to dismiss KK as ‘politically motivated meant to win votes and milk support from rural citizens. Lwinda (2009), quoting Mbozi Member of Parliament, as saying “Although I’m a member of the ruling party, I also believe this has only to do with politics definitely next year’s elections.” This show that most of the agricultural and development made in Tanzania have political motives and nothing to do with what they are claimed to be for. KK therefore, constituted a dramatic reversal of previous agricultural policy, appealing to private, large-scale farmers and advocating the repeal of the Village Land Act ‘to facilitate alienation of village land (TNBC, 2009). Contradictory statements continue to be given by the government leaders. For example, at the annual ‘Nanenane’ agricultural show in Dodoma in August 2009, Mr Kikwete launched the KK strategy, claiming that: ‘the private sector has been the only missing link in past agricultural declarations and initiatives, but was now incorporated in the ‘Agriculture First’ strategy. He said the private sector is critical in meeting the Agriculture First goals and the engine in bringing a green revolution to the country by investing in large scale farming (Agola, 2009). Additionally Mr Kikwete declared that the government will privatise national ranches for the private sector to engage in large-scale farming. Not here, is the president’s concern with greedy middlemen and the ASDP/TAFSIP/MAFC argument that the local private sector is ‘weak’. Moreover, in April 2012, Mr Kikwete when attended the Grow Africa Investment Forum in

Addis Ababa, organised jointly by the WEF, the AU and NEPAD, he said: “We are ready to do business, that’s why we came to this meeting. When we bring in the private sector, it is to benefit the smallholder farmers. We need to modernize agriculture and make it more attractive to youth. However, in contrast, these pro-market sentiments with Mr Kikwete’s December, 2012 views on cashew nut marketing were: ‘We know some buyers want Warehouse Receipt System to fail, but we can’t go back on this. Private dealers who fail to comply with the new system will lose their licenses.’” The President ‘would rather see the Cashewnut Board of Tanzania (CBT) take over bulk purchasing than allow traders to exploit smallholders. According to Lugongo (2012), cashew cooperatives are building up large debts with the commercial banks, which finance the costly and inefficient WRS. While, the losses are passed on to the treasury or taxpayer or donor.

KK is claimed to be designed to empower the national (non-Asian) commercial agriculture sector, but the Asian cartels have strategic political influence. The GoT’s 2011 Agricultural Marketing Strategy states that: ‘The Government, in collaboration with other stakeholders, will put in place a framework to address anti-competitive market practices, including cartels and monopolistic tendencies. KK’s concern with mechanisation as a key element of agricultural transformation was quickly turned into a major, highly dubious, deal involving local Asian traders and the army in the importation and sale of Indian-made tractors and power tillers financed with a soft loan from India’s Exim Bank’.

Experience from agricultural Mechanisation tenders given to military in January 2010 the when Tanzanian government borrowed USD 40 million from India’s Export-Import Bank to import tractors and power tillers under Kilimo Kwanza. The loan being administered by SUMA-JKT, the commercial wing of the military’s National Service (JKT), where the power tillers were to be assembled by the Tanzania Automotive Technology Centre, also a military interest, which had been virtually dormant for years; funny enough, the Ministry of Agriculture was not involved. The bulk of the tender was also awarded to Escorts Agri-Machinery with the remainder to the Mahindra group. Escorts was represented by Jeetu Patel, who faces six corruption charges related to the embezzlement of USD 120 m from the Bank of Tanzania in 2004. While Mahindra’s agent is Yusuf Manji, head of Tanzania’s Quality Group who has been accused of instigating delays in processing the loan. When the tender was first launched in July 2009, the state-owned Indian company HMT complained of an ‘ongoing scam’ and accused Tanzania government of colluding with Indian companies and local businessmen to fix the terms of tender.

The obvious puzzle is why Tanzania’s increasingly besieged ruling elite would suddenly abandon its established pro-smallholder policy discourse as enshrined in ASDP in favour of one promoting capitalist farming--including foreign-owned estates and farms--which has been anathema to the Tanzanian public for many years. Cooksey 2011b discusses contemporary land conflicts between villagers and estates in Arumeru District (Arusha). Before a 2012 by-election in Arumeru, both ruling and lead opposition parties vowed to repossess by force land leased to foreigners for recreational purposes. The ruling party

narrowly won the election and the promised invasion duly took place. Strategically placed members of the elite see their best chance of capitalising on their access to land in JVs with external partners, taking advantage of the unprecedented pro-market reforms that the US and the G8 are attempting to leverage through support for CAADP/TAFSIP. Since well before liberalisation, the ruling elite has been accumulating prime urban and rural land, through both market and non-market transactions. Public institutions such as the army and prisons own substantial amounts of land, as does the ruling CCM.

Numerous state owned estates and ranches have been leased to private investors. Other state-owned ranches and estates covering hundreds of thousands of hectares have underperformed as public assets but are yet to be privatized. Much of the land controlled privately by members of the ruling elite or retained by the state has generally not been developed commercially because of the high risks and costs involved, stemming inter alia from the poor condition of infrastructure, power supply and other aspects of the 'investment environment, and inadequate market coordination capacity. Tanzania's rank in the World Economic Forum's annual Global Competitiveness Survey is poor and getting worse. The same constraints discourage both indigenous and foreign investment in agriculture. An elite strategy targeting rent capture from control of valuable land resources requires at a minimum formal commitment to a market-led development policy (Cardoso, 2013).

Despite potential conflicts of interest, both local investors and the G8 have started to lobby for the abolition of agricultural cesses and taxes. Also, private sector lobbies target trade bans and non-tariff barriers to regional trade, in which Tanzania is perceived to be out of step with the rest of the EAC (Mwakyusa, 2012). For example, a 2011 export ban is said to have 'significantly worsened' food shortages in Kenya. Occasional bans on sugar and maize exports to Kenya encourage smuggling and bribery (Kimenyi et al., 2012; Mjema, 2012).

Tanzania's ruling elite clearly sees major benefits from alignment with the US's foreign policy, diplomacy, aid, and commercial interests, but the policy reforms to which it has signed up are unprecedented and it remains to be seen what will change and how rapidly. The new MNC-driven policy and KK will have to confront vested interests. This is difficult for the ruling elite to accept since it is complicit, formally and informally, in the rent-seeking, state capture, and plunder of state resources that currently undermine the market rationale, while helping bolster the ruling party's chances of staying united and winning elections. A growing number of private equity and venture capital funds are investing in Tanzanian agribusiness. For example, in late 2012, the Carlyle Group announced that they, the Pembani Remgro Infrastructure Fund, and Standard Chartered Private Equity had agreed to invest USD 210m in Export Trading Group (ETG). ETG is described as a 'Global Agricultural Supply Chain Manager.' ETG are said to be politically well-connected at the highest level in Tanzania. What the Carlyle-ETG deal will mean in practice remains to be seen. Another more recent deal saw Rand Merchant Bank (RMB)

arrange a \$100 million syndicated loan facility for the trading arm of MeTL (Mohamed Enterprises Tanzania Ltd), one of Tanzania's largest diversified conglomerates.' The loan is syndicated with China Construction Bank, Citibank and Nedbank.

Alignment and coordination among the Tanzanian agricultural initiatives that is ASDS/ASDP, KK, and CAADP/TAFSIP is questionable because in numerous fundamental ways they are incompatible. For example, both ASDP and TAFSIP are premised on largely public investments, whereas KK foresees massive FDI driving sectoral investment and growth. The coordination requirements for the two approaches are quite distinct.

The integration of small-scale producers into international value chains, out-grower schemes and contract farming will mean they will be supplied with industrial agriculture inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and seeds) and they will have to produce enough to: pay the suppliers for costs of these inputs; make good profits for the suppliers in international markets and, lastly c) to earn an income for their livelihoods. This means that small scale farmers can easily become trapped in debt if production is insufficient to repay their debts. They can in fact become poorer than before as they will not the opportunity to grow crops for local trade and levels of hunger might increase as they are not producing food. It also means that rural people will be used as source of cheap labour.

To mobilise finance for investments CAADP also foresees tapping into rural peoples' savings and savings' clubs. Instead of African states providing agricultural subsidies to decrease the cost of agricultural production, poor peoples' small savings will be used to subsidise production. This also means that their savings will become captured into the larger capitalist financial circles.

Key agricultural advisers to CAADP are: (a) CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agriculture), a network of international agricultural research centres, including public financed centres. CGIAR is involved in the commercialisation of agriculture, including cooperation with commercial public-private plant breeding programmes (e.g. providing "germplasm" to AGRA - Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa); (b) the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), who advocates the usage of GMOs and strong Intellectual Property Rights regimes. This means that state funds are used to finance research that benefits large foreign investors and large scale commercial farmers. Instead we believe that state funds must be allocated to research and infrastructure geared towards the needs of small-scale farmers: improved seeds, soil fertility and water access, measures to adapt to climate change and access to local markets and credit.

Another challenge is that, CAADP does not pay specific attention to the needs of women farmers. At a recent CAADP meeting in Addis Ababa (25-27 March 2013) the NEPAD Programme officer, admitted that rural women's voices have been overlooked and stated that CAADP country guidelines would be revised soon to see where women can influence national governments. Thus specific attention must be given to women food producers,

who produce up to 70-80% of the food in Africa. Women need preferential and secure access to land, water and production assets, as they are often marginalised in accessing land and other natural resources, in political representation and decision making, while also having to assume other multiple responsibilities for family and community life. We also believe that a simple revision of country guidelines is not sufficient, unless the whole of the continental CAADP framework is revised.

Harmonisation of seed laws is being forced through the 1991 version of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). This UPOV version limits the rights of farmers to save and share seeds. This poses a very serious threat to small-scale producers, and their ability to remain independent autonomous producers; SADC member states that are also part of COMESA: DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

While the cultivation of modified (GM) crops foods has been Banned and suspended in many countries around the world (e.g. Austria, Italy, Ireland, Egypt, Japan, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom), moratoriums on field trials have been imposed for a few years till more research on their impact on humans, animals and the environment is concluded. This has happened at national level or in provinces where there is democratic control under local governments: as a result 99% of Austria and Italy, for example, are now GM-free zones. In India, grassroots movements have also declared thousands of villages GMO-free zones.

In 2012 the French Professor Séralini and co-workers released the results of an independent two year study on the effects of feeding rats with Monsanto's GMO Roundup Ready Maize (NK 603). The study revealed that, in comparison with rats not eating GM maize, all groups fed on GM maize diets had higher mortality rates and female groups had 2 -3 times more premature deaths; 50-80% of females had developed tumors (compared to 30% in the females in the control group). In males, liver congestion and premature cell death were 2.5 – 5.5 times higher than in the control groups. Groups fed water with traces of Roundup formulations below officially set safety limits, displayed severe disturbances in the liver, kidneys and mammary glands. The results were disputed by Monsanto and others propagating GMOs but taken very seriously by some governments that immediately imposed further restrictions on the importation and cultivation of GMOs. Nigeria began reconsidering its previous pending biotechnology bill that would have allowed GMOs in the country. In Peru a struggle by farmers (November 2012) also led the government to ban the use, import and cultivation of GM crops for the next 10 years. We are aware that many countries in the world have banned or placed moratoriums on GM crops mostly due to pressure from the ground. Thus, we must ask: why are African countries being used to dump GM technology, when elsewhere in the world other countries are either banning or imposing moratoriums on GM food? What lessons can we learn from grassroots movements that have managed to declare GM free zones in their (Cardoso, 2013)? As it is the case with Tanzania, no local concerns with food

security or boosting export earnings from agriculture drove the GoT to embrace CAADP as a strand of its agricultural policy.

Byiers suggests that investors' apparent objective of working with smallholders may prove elusive: 'The Maputo Development Corridor experience suggests that the focus on small-scale producers and traders can get lost due to other more immediate concerns. The time and financial costs involved in working with smallholders and their representatives are high. For SAGCOT to achieve its development objectives, investors will have to be willing to absorb these costs.


In sum, NAFSN and a plethora of other external initiatives have come on stream with the primary objective of opening Tanzania to agribusiness investments, while providing seed capital for some commercial investments. The G8's endorsement of CAADP/TAFSIP challenges the national policy dominance of KK, while effectively giving TAFSIP responsibility for implementing policies that are much more in line with the spirit of KK than with ASDP/TAFSIP. Bilateral aid agencies have adjusted rapidly to the emerging 'multinationalisation' of African agricultural policy by financing equity funds to help 'crowd in' further private investments and by financing targeted infrastructure out of aid budgets.

### **5.3 Tanzania Government Commitment to 2003 Maputo Declaration**

To have an idea about government commitment to the Maputo Declaration it is imperative to examine whether CAADP major targets have been achieved namely allocating 10% of the budget to the agricultural sector and achieving 6% agricultural growth per annum.

#### ***5.2.1 Allocation of 10% of the budget to agriculture in Tanzania***

Since 2001/02 the agricultural budget in Tanzania has generally been increasing gradually in nominal terms. It was only TSh. 52.1 billions, equivalent to 3.0 percent of the national budget in 2000/01 and since then it had more than doubled to 7.8 percent in 2010/11, but it declined to 6.9 percent in 2011/12. However, statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture do not suggest that this increment is associated with CAADP decision because the increment started the same year the Declaration was made in 2003, and dropped by one percent to 4.7 percent a year later. Two years later, in 2006/07 there was no increment at all. Worse still, in 2011/12 financial year, the allocation declined further to below 6.8 percent from the 7.8 percent allocated during the previous year as could be noted in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Trend of nominal budget allocation to agriculture (2001/2– 2011/12)**

**Source:** Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives<sup>9</sup>


Although it has been demonstrated that the budget for agriculture has been rising over time, but, as stated previously, the budget figures are nominal values, which do not necessarily reflect real increase in allocation because inflation is not taken into account. It is very much possible that the incremented is not as high as the public may be made to believe, or there might have not been any increment at all. This might further explain the reason behind sector growth stagnation albeit nominal budget increase; with high inflation rate, the volume and quantities of work are drastically reduced. For example, a study carried out by ANSAF (2012) indicates that when adjustment for inflation is made, the difference between nominal and real budget ranges between 4.9 percent (2002) and 49.1 percent (2011), meaning that the budget allocated to agriculture, for instance in 2011, was almost 50% of the stated figure in nominal terms.

While Tanzania is struggling to reach the 10% CAADP target, some countries have made it and the impact on agricultural growth is vivid. Such countries include Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, and Niger.

<sup>9</sup> Departments have been shifting from one agriculture lead ministry to another. This has been taken into consideration in the data compilation

It should be cautioned that some studies misconceivably indicate that, actually, Tanzania has already surpassed the 10% budget allocation to agriculture. For example a study carried out by the Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policies project (MAFAP) in 2012 indicate that between 2006/07 Tanzania's spending on agriculture has surpassed CAADP target of 10%. For example, the allocation was 12.5% in 2006/07; 15% in 2007/08; 16% in 2008/09; and 13% in 2009/10. Thereafter the allocation has declined a bit (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Total public expenditures in support of food and agriculture sector**



**Source:** MAFAP, 2012


The heart of the matter is that in computing budgetary allocation the study considered other components that beyond the definition of 'agriculture' as per AU and IMF definition. The study considered also expenditure on Rural education Rural health water and sanitation and energy.

### **5.2.2 Agricultural sector growth rate in Tanzania**

Like in the previous CAADP target of 10%, the 6% annual growth rate in agriculture has not been achieved despite solid economic growth (Figure 5). Because of weaker performance of agriculture Tanzania has not been able to achieve significant reductions in poverty or shown some improvements in nutritional status. The Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) amplifying the observations of the Poverty and

Human Development Report of 2009 asserts that in 2007, the national poverty headcount fell by only 2.1 percent from 35.7 percent in 2000-01 to 32.6 percent. Nutritional indicators also showed little improvement. Over the same period, the share of people with insufficient calorie (food) consumption fell by only 1.5 percent from 25.0 percent to 23.5 percent; and stunting of children under-five years of age was unchanged at 38 percent.

**Figure 5: Agriculture and GDP growth rates in Tanzania**



Source: MAFAP, 2012

#### 5.4 Engagement of Small Scale Farmers in CAADP Process in Tanzania

Engagement of smallholder farmers in the CAADP process is implied in the TAFSIP document when it is stated in Box.

##### Box 6: TAFSIP stand on engagement of smallholder farmers

*...the TAFSIP is a product of a broad based collaborative process involving key stakeholders; including national and sectoral institutions from public and private sector, development partners, members of academia, civil society organisations, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union Commission (AUC), NEPAD-CAADP Pillar Institutions and the National CAADP Task Force comprising representatives of all relevant stakeholders, ReSAKSS/IFPRI and other regional and international bodies..*

Broad based as the process claims to be it is unimaginable that smallholder farmers were left out. They were definitely represented by civil society organisations. Unfortunately TAFSIP document does not annex a list people and institutions that were involved in the TAFSIP creation process. To examine how the smallholder farmers were involved interviews of knowledgeable informants was undertaken in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. As stated earlier in the methodology section, various stakeholders were interviewed including the Ministry of agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) such as POLICY FORUM, ANSAF, ESRF, and farmers' organisations such ESAFF, MVIWATA).

It was argued that in formulating TAFSIP a Task Force consisting of a few academicians was composed. These were selected strategically taking into consideration the level of loyalty to the government. The African Development Bank (AfDB) reveals that one of the agricultural experts was dropped in the list because a senior official in MAFC claimed that the expert always criticises the government. Then the government a stakeholder meeting was convened to discuss priority areas. Stakeholders such as farmer organisations, NGOs, Research organisation, donors, the government on one part, private sectors, higher learning institutions, cooperatives; directorate of research MAFC, the Lead ministries, 20 farmers from each zone attended. It is asserted that moreover, MAFC sent officers in the regions to sensitize and create awareness among farmers on the new Agricultural program that was to be adopted. However the list of farmers who attended was not unveiled.

It was also argued that, before CAADP implementation started a thorough analysis of the existing gaps within the already existing initiatives like Kilimo kwanza, ASDP, Mkukuta and others was undertaken, and suggestion on how the gaps were to be filled in order to match with CAADP were given. This is clearly reflected in the appendices of the TAFSIP document. Unfortunately, one of the weaknesses that were identified was that there has been too much focus on small scale production and weak involvement of large scale private farmers.

It was noted that the directorate of research at MAFC was involved in proposal development and budgeting, but no farmers were involved at this stage. However, farmers were invited to participate in the stakeholders meeting. MAFC argues that, in a way, the majority of farmers participated in drafting the proposal through ministry officials who were deployed in various agricultural zones to collect farmer views and opinions. Nevertheless, regions visited were mentioned as Morogoro, Mwanza, Mbeya and Arusha. The whole process was done in the year 2010-2011. In addition, MAFC claims that civil society organisations, Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and ANSAF were directly involved.

Nevertheless, interview with Eastern and Southern Research Foundation (ESRF), Policy Forum and ANSAF, MVIWATA and ESAFF painted a different picture. It was noted that all the respondents were aware of CAADP initiative and its associated TAFSIP. However, none of the respondent was able to articulate the synergy among the different interventions; they considered all of them to be synonyms.

One thing that became apparent was that interviewed stakeholders were not aware whether farmers were involved, or not except that, some farmer forums like MVIWATA, ESAFF and ANSAF got involved at institutional level. Whether their contributions were honoured and accommodated into TAFSIP is not known. Even if they were among the participants they may have been confused by a lot of vocabularies regarding the existing and the new initiatives.

Whether smallholder are benefiting from TAFSIP stakeholders observed that it too early to say; but it will depend on a number of factors like infrastructures, government commitment, land law reforms to protect farmers' land from being grabbed by foreigners as well as middle income Tanzanians. However, farmers are benefiting indirectly from CAADP through the National Input Voucher System (NAIVS) and many interventions in the realms of ASDP. Generally at the moment farmers associate CAADP implementation with land grabbing and escalating hostility between smallholders and large-scale farmers.

To ensure that small scale farmers and civil society organisations participate in CAADP five officially recognised Regional Farmers' Organisations launched the Pan African Farmers' Organization (PAFO). PAFO which now has a "voice" as a non-state actor (NSA) in the CAADP Working Group at continental level and are working in close collaboration with the AU to implement CAADP in a way that benefit smallholder farmers.

In addition to views of stakeholders expressed above a research by ActionAid in 2011 showed that the CAADP continental framework and plans were paying little attention to the needs and rights of smallholders in general and women farmers in particular. The plans are mostly silent on climate change, lack a clear poverty focus and money for implementation is woefully inadequate. ActionAid states that "unless these gaps are closed they "could reinforce rather than reduce rural impoverishment". The same research also showed that similarly to the CAADP continental framework the strategies and plans adopted at country level in six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Kenya) reflected the same gaps as the CAADP framework. With emphasis on "new technologies", "value chains" and exports the majority of African farmers will be excluded.

## 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Implementation of Maputo Declaration is a tricky thing. This is because the Declaration and the resulting CAADP are broad frameworks. Countries, after signing CAADP Compacts and establishment of investment plan, are at liberty to design operational programmes. For Tanzania, operational programmes have been numerous with little or no coherence. Apart from political statements, there is no economic evidence that agricultural development programmes that are implemented in Tanzania are clearly linked to the Maputo Declaration and to each other. All in all, Tanzania has missed both targets of CAADP. Over the last 10 years since the targets were set, the country has managed to increase agricultural spending by an average of 6.2% (instead of 10%) and agricultural growth rate has marginally increased from 3.2% in 2003/04 to only 3.8% in 2011/12 despite a multitude of programmes. A critical concern by stakeholders is that CAADP process has not been inclusive enough, thus making it top-down by nature. Smallholder farmers claim that they have not been involve in decision making during formulation and implementation of CAADP. On the other hand the government claims that all important stakeholders were and are still being involved though their representatives.

The following recommendations are give

- Serious planning keen in making a difference should deliberately invite and accommodate criticism. After the plan had been formulated it should be subjected to demystification by asking credible critical minded individuals and institutions to critique it. The current tendency of involving only experts who say what the government wants to here alone will never make a dent in the effort to transform the agricultural sector.
- Government ministries, departments and agencies should put in place clear rules to fully and transparently involve civil society networks in policy processes and dialogue. In doing so the government should recognise the difference between instrumental and symbolic involvement of stakeholders. Instrumental participation is where participation is active whereas in symbolic participation stakeholders are passive participants of the process. Instead of inviting representatives of stakeholders, it is recommended that the draft plans should be sent to the stakeholders and be given ample time to discuss within their circles and submit comments/views to the planners.
- The government should fulfil its international commitment of allocating 10% of the national budget to the agriculture sector without excuses.
- The multitude of agricultural development programs in Tanzania should be rationalised and harmonised into one comprehensive initiative for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness.
- Political will and prioritization of agriculture is one thing, and implementation is entirely a different thing. Planning has never been a problem in this country. Tanzania has very good plans probably better than TAFSIP, but the problem has always been on the implement side. It is recommended that agricultural

development programmes that are underway should be implemented in the framework of the newly composed institution, the Presidential Delivery Bureau (PDB) and the Agricultural Delivery Agency when created.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix 1: Interview Guide for Civil Society Organisations (CSO)**

1. Name of interviewee and institution
2. For how long has your institution been engaged in pro-smallholder farmers' advocacy issues?
3. Can you explain the process by which TAFSIP was formulated?
4. How was your organisation involved in the process of formulating TAFSIP?
5. How were smallholder farmers involved in the process?
6. How is TAFSIP implemented in Tanzania?
7. Is your organisation involved in the monitoring of TAFSIP implementation? How?
8. How do you think smallholder farmers could benefit from TAFSIP? Are they benefiting?
9. What is a missing link? How do you think smallholder farmer could be involved effectively in the implementation of TAFSIP?

**Appendix 2: Interview Guide for CAADP Desk Officer at MAFC**

1. Name of interviewee and Department
2. How long have you been engaged in coordinating CAADP?
3. How are these concepts related: NEPAD, CAADP, TAFSIP and CAADP Compact?
4. Can you explain the process by which TAFSIP was formulated?
5. How was your department involved in the process of formulating TAFSIP?
6. How were smallholder farmers involved in the process? If yes, how?
7. Can you show a clear link between TAFSIP and ASDP, Kilimo Kwanza, SAGCOT, MKUKUTA, Five-Year development plan and 'Big Result Now'?
8. How is your department or ministry involved in the monitoring of TAFSIP implementation?
9. Do you think smallholder farmers are benefiting from TAFSIP? How
10. What are the challenges in implementing TAFSIP? What could be done to improve TAFSIP implementation?

**Appendix 3: Milestones for implementation of Kilimo Kwanza**

**TEN PILLARS OF KILIMO KWANZA  
(IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK)**

<b>PILLAR No. 1 NATIONAL VISION ON KILIMO KWANZA</b>					
	<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>TASKS</b>	<b>TIME FRAME</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITY</b>	
				<b>Lead</b>	<b>Key Collaborators</b>
1.1	Adopt the Vision of KILIMO KWANZA	1. THE KILIMO KWANZA RESOLUTION	August 2009	H.E. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania	All Leaders CEO's
		2. Start the implementation program of KILIMO KWANZA			
		3. Instil political will at all levels of leadership and commitment by Tanzanians to the KILIMO KWANZA Resolution	Continuous		
1.2	Modernise and commercialise agriculture for peasant, small, medium and large scale producers.	1. Transform peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers through emphasis on productivity and tradability.	2009 - 2015	MAFC	MITM; MLDF; PMO-RALG; MWI; MLHS LGA's; TPSF; NGO's/CBO/ FBO.
		2. Promote medium and large scale farmers for the full realisation of the vision of KILIMO KWANZA	2009 - 2015	MAFC	MITM; MLDF; PMO-RALG; MWI; MLHS LGA's; TPSF; NGO's/CBO/ FBO.

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 2 FINANCING KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
2.1	Increase Government Budgetary allocation to KILIMO KWANZA	1. Allocate not less than 10% of National Budget to agriculture in 2010/11 and progressively increase thereafter	Start December 2009	MoFEA	MDA's
		2. Budget of all other Ministries to be oriented to supporting KILIMO KWANZA	Start December 2009	PMO	MoFEA, MDA'S,LGA'S
		3. Encourage Development Partners to support KILIMO KWANZA	Continuous	MoFEA	MDA'S
		4. Increase budgetary allocation to irrigate over 7 million hectares.	By 2015	MWI	MAFC MoFEA, DP's
2.2	Establish the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB)	Fast track the establishment of TADB with initial capitalisation of US\$ 500 million	December 2009	BOT	MoFEA
2.3	Mobilise resources for the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank	1. Mobilize Loans and Grants arrangements for TADB from Multilateral and Bilateral Sources	Start August 2009	MoFEA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; DP'S
		2. Undertake consultations with Commercial Banks and other stakeholders towards holding of TADB Bonds.	Start August 2009	BOT	MoFEA

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 2 FINANCING KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
2.4	Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) to have a special window for concessionary lending for agricultural production	Increase allocation to the TIB Agriculture Window for concessionary long term lending.	August 2009	MoFEA	DP'S, IFIs
2.5	Establish a Special Fund for KILIMO KWANZA	Mobilise adequate resources for the Special Fund to address land survey costs, investment, capacity building and guarantees to complement the requirements of KILIMO KWANZA	Start December 2009	MoFEA	DP'S, TPSF
2.6	Enhance Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) Basket Funding to implement KILIMO KWANZA	Broaden Development Partners' participation in ASDP Basket Funding	Start August 2009	MoFEA	DP'S
2.7	Mobilize enhanced agricultural investment by private sector – small, medium and large	Mobilize the private sector to increase investments in KILIMO KWANZA	Start August 2009	TPSF	PMO, MoFEA, DP'S, ACT, CTI, TCCIA, HODECT

## Appendix 3: Continued

	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
2.8	Empower Farmers' Cooperatives and SACCOs to mobilize, manage and channel funds for agricultural production to their members	1. Develop national strategy for financial literacy	Start August 2009	BOT	MoFEA, BANKS
		2. Implement financial education programs and strengthen Farmers Cooperatives and SACCOs' capacity to effectively manage resources for KILIMO KWANZA	3. Start August 2009	MAFC	LGA'S, NGO/CBO/FBO
2.9	Legislate for Commercial Banks to lend a percentage of their deposits on concessionary terms to agricultural production	1. Negotiate with commercial banks and other stakeholders on concessionary lending for agricultural production	Start August 2009	MoFEA	MoCAJ; BOT
		2. Review prudential regulations to encourage lending to agricultural production	Start August 2009	BOT	TBA
2.10	Extend the establishment of community banks in every region of Tanzania.	1. Establish community banks and financial institutions in rural areas	Start August 2009	PMO	MAFC; PMO-RALG BOT,
		2. Build the capacity of Community Banks' management and strengthen their Association			
2.11	Establish special units in financial institutions for mobilizing and disbursing agricultural credit	Community banks and other financial institutions like Tanzania Postal Bank, NGOs and microfinance institutions to establish special units for mobilizing and disbursing agricultural credit	Start August 2009	BOT	TBA, BANKS

**Appendix 3: Continued**

	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
2.12	Establish Commodity Exchanges and facilitation of floatation of agricultural companies	1. Establish Commodity Exchanges	Start August 2009	CMSA	MoFEA, TPSF
		2. Facilitate floatation of agricultural companies at the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange			
2.13	Pension, empowerment and other funds to agree on mechanism and percentage of these funds to invest in agricultural production at concessionary terms	1. Negotiate with pension and other empowerment funds to lend on concessionary terms to agricultural production	Start August 2009	MoFEA	PSPF, NSSF, PPF, LAPF, GPF
		2. Establish the Vision Tanzania Fund for lending to agricultural production	Start August 2009	MoFEA	UTT
2.14	Establish social security arrangements for farmers	1. Establish a specific social security fund for farmers	August 2009	MoFEA	PMO-RALG
		2. Mobilize farmers to join social security schemes			
2.15	Institute policy instruments to facilitate insurance companies to extend cover and lending to agriculture	Negotiate with insurance companies to provide insurance cover for agricultural production.	December 2009	MoFEA	PMO-RALG, All insurance companies in Tanzania.

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 3 INSTITUTIONAL REORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT OF KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
3.1	Institutional reorganization for KILIMO KWANZA	1. Instil good governance in all sectors of the economy and at all levels.	As early as possible	H.E. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania	
		2. Strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture and streamline the functions of agricultural related cluster			
		3. Mainstream environmental factors in all aspects of KILIMO KWANZA	Continuous	Office of the Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania	MDA's, LGA'S, TPSF
		4. Establish an autonomous National Irrigation Agency (NIA) under MAFC	As early as possible	H.E. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania	
		5. Reorganize the two irrigation funds under the proposed National Irrigation Agency (NIA)			

**Appendix 3: Continued**

	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
3.2	Establish a mechanism for coordinating other Ministries	Establish Ministerial Planning Coordination Committee to coordinate agricultural related activities of all the Ministries.	As early as possible	PMO	MoFEA, MLHS, MITM, MLDF, MWI, PMO-RALG; MAFC
3.3	Establish a mechanism for public/private partnership for KILIMO KWANZA	1. Establish a National Agriculture and Cooperatives Commission (NACC) for public private partnership in agriculture as well as monitoring and evaluating the implementation for KILIMO KWANZA.	July 2010	PMO	TPSF
		2. To carryout planned monitoring and evaluation activities	Immediate	PMO	MAFC
3.4	Strengthen farmers' organizations for full partnership with Government in agricultural policy and strategy formulation, implementation and evaluation	Support capacity building of farmers and farmers' organizations in the implementation of KILIMO KWANZA programmes.	Start August 2009	MAFC	ACT/NGO/CB O/FBO

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 4 PARADIGM SHIFT TO STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
4.1	Identify priority areas for strategic food commodities for the country's food self sufficiency	1. Put in place arrangements for production of strategic commodities such as maize, cassava, rice, legumes, fish, meat and dairy products, wheat, bananas, potatoes, sorghum, millet.	Start August 2009	MAFC	MITM MLDF PMO-RALG MWI, MLHS, TPSF
		2. Introduce cassava blending in both maize and wheat milling	December 2009	MAFC MITM,	PMO-RALG, TPSF
4.2	Identify priority areas and modalities for production of crops that can transform agriculture quickly with minimal financial and technological requirements, growing domestic/external market demand and employment creation potential.	Put in place arrangements to finance the production of cotton, sunflower, safflower, sesame, palm oil.	Start August 2009	MAFC PMO-	RALG, MLHS, TPSF
4.3	Identify priority areas and modalities for production of horticultural crops	Put in place arrangements for the production of high labour intensive crops requiring limited investment with potential for significant foreign exchange earnings and contribution to national economic growth such as onions, mangoes, bananas, grapes, avocados, pineapples, tomatoes, vegetables and spices	Start August 2009	MAFC	PMO-RALG TPSF, TIB

**Appendix 3: Continued**

	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
4.4	Identify priority areas and modalities for production of crops with high value- addition potential such as fibers, bio-energy etc	Put in place arrangements for increased production of sisal, sugarcane, oilseeds and sweet sorghum for energy and other value added products.	Start August 2009	MAFC	PMO-RALG, TPSF
4.5	Establish a Strategic Advisory Team on Paradigm Shift	Set up a Strategic Advisory Team incorporating private sector to advise on areas where various activities in the Paradigm Shift will be undertaken.	December 2009	MAFC	MITM, MLDF, PMO-RALG, MWI, MLHS, TPSF
4.6	Undertake value chain analysis on the priority commodities	Undertake value chain analysis with holistic approach which looks at the priority areas including suitable models for integrating agricultural producers and processors	Start August 2009	POPC.	MAFC, MITM, MLDF, PMO-RALG MWI, MLHS
4.7	Legislate Contract Farming System	1. Fast- track Contract Farming System Legislation	Start August 2009	MAFC	MoCAJ TPSF
		2. Carry out capacity building measures for the parties involved in Contract Farming and their organizations.			

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 5 LAND FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
5.1	Amend the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999.	Amend the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 to facilitate equitable access to village land for KILIMO KWANZA investments.	By 2010	MLHS	PMO-RALG
		Strengthen capacity of District Land Officers and empower District Councils to execute their land related tasks			
5.2	Fast track land delivery system	1. Enforce laws on rural land use planning and town planning to include processes leading to issuance of title deeds;	By 2010	MLHS	PMO-RALG
		2. Demarcate separate land for crops and livestock and gazette such land demarcation	Start August 2009	MLHS	PMO-RALG
		3. Allocate enough resources to District/Town Councils to be able to implement planned activities in relation to land	By 2010	MLHS	PMO-RALG
		4. Build capacity of Land Offices in Local Government Authorities to efficiently and effectively administer land matters and strengthen supervision by District Executive Directors			
		5. Re-examine land surveying costs for provisioning of Certificates of Registration.			

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 5 LAND FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
5.3	Fast tracking land Dispute Resolution	1. Establish systems for expeditious dispute resolution	2010	MLHS	
		2. Allocate resources for adjudication in the Courts system (personnel funding)			
		3. Establish Ward and Village Land Councils and strengthen the existing ones in relation to land dispute resolutions			
5.4	Institute structural change in land management	Review and streamline the existing arrangements of granting land allocation.	By 2010	MLHS	PMO-RALG
5.5	Include Agricultural Green Belts into Urban Development Plans.	Urban development plans to provide for Agricultural Green Belts	By 2010	MLHS	
5.6	Allocate land to the Land Bank	1. Regional Commissioners to establish Land Banks for commercial production and investments.	By 2009	PMO	RC; MLHS; MAFC
		2. Identify and record underutilized land for agricultural investments.	Start August 2009	MLHS	PMO- RALG
		3. Legislate measures to enable villages and villagers to use their land as equity in joint ventures with investors.	August 2009	PMO	MAFC; TIC
		4. Review Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) Derivative Rights to facilitate Tanzanians to enter into joint ventures in land based investments.	December 2009	MLHS	
		5. Work out a land valuation formula to reflect current market value for investment purposes	August 2009	PMO	MAFC; TIC
		6. Enforce the provision of the law to avoid land hoarding and speculation	By 2010	MLHS	
5.7	To effectively utilize land currently owned by Government and Government Agencies	Utilize land belonging to Government Institutions for agricultural production.	End 2009	PMO	MLHS, PMO-RALG

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 6 INCENTIVES FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
6.1	Determine Fiscal and other Incentives to stimulate KILIMO KWANZA	Establish a Special Task Force to review and recommend necessary Fiscal and other Incentives to stimulate KILIMO KWANZA	August 2009	MoFEA	MAFC, MITM, MLDF, PMO-RALG MWI, MLHS. TNBC, TIC
6.2	Assess and consider measures to enhance the competitiveness of Tanzanian Agriculture.	Review the cost of doing business in the agricultural sector to make it more competitive.	December 2009	POPC	TNBC, TPSF
6.3	Remove market barriers to agricultural commodities	1. Allocate more resources to the National Food Reserve Agency to regulate the prices of food crops and make the Government the buyer of last resort	2009/10	MITM	MoFEA, MAFC, LGA's, PMO-RALG, MoHA
		2. Expand the capacity of National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) for larger scale procurement and storage.			
		3. Encourage increased private sector participation in buying and stocking of food crops.			
		4. Maintain stock of food supply for 6 months to 1 year to ensure conditions of market stability	Start August 2009	MITM	MAFC TPSF
		5. Regularize border trade on food items	Continuous		

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 6 INCENTIVES FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
6.4	Strict adherence and enforcement of standard weights and measures.	1. Enforce regulations to sell crops in proper weights and measures i.e. not in lumbesa, pakacha, sado, etc	Start August 2009	MITM	MoHA
		2. Regulatory bodies to impose measures on proper grading and packaging of agricultural goods			
6.5	Development body for mixed crops	Establish a development and regulatory body to oversee production and marketing of mixed crops	December 2009	MAFC	MoCAJ
6.6	Price Stabilization	Establish price stabilization mechanism for agricultural commodities.	2010	MITM	MoFEA

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No.7 INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
7.1	Industrialization to address the needs of agricultural producers.	Identify and address the needs of Tanzania's agricultural producers.	December 2009	MITM	TPSF
7.2.1	Backward linkages: Increase Fertilizer production and utilization	1. Enhance and improve production and quality of fertilizer from the current Phosphates and NPK production at Minjingu to 300,000 tons and above per annum by 2010.	Start August 2009	MITM	TPSF
		2. Explore large scale production of Nitrogen based fertilizers using the available natural gas deposits			
		3. Enhance extension services to create demand and to ensure appropriate use of fertilizers	Continuous	MAFC	TPSF
		4. Facilitate availability of fertilizers.	Annually	MAFC	MoFEA
7.2.2	Improve seeds production	1. Undertake immediate assessment of the performance of all the privatized seed companies (TANSEED) in order to meet the national demand.	Start August 2009	MAFC	
		2. Enforce the Seed Act to eliminate the rampant sale of fake seeds	Annual		
		3. Subsidize high quality and certified seeds to small scale farmers.	December 2009	MAFC	
		4. Empower and strengthen Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute (TOSCI) to become a regulator.	December 2009		
		5. Patent results of seed research to protect locally developed seed varieties.			

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No.7 INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
7.2.3	Establish and enhance capacity for development of livestock industry	1. Strengthen the National Artificial Insemination Centre (NAIC) in Arusha and introduce semen storage and distribution centres in all regions	December 2010	MLDF	TPSF
		2. Ensure adequate local production of veterinary drugs and animal feeds			
		3. Ensure adequate local production of veterinary drugs and animal feeds			
		4. Rehabilitate all existing milk processing plants in the country and establish milk collection centres			
7.2.4	Establish and enhance capacity for development of fish industry	1. Invest in facilities for the full utilization of marine resources.	Continuo- us	MLDF	TPSF
		2. Prepare and facilitate fish farming programme for every distric			
		3. Strengthen and expand fish breeding centers for supply of fingerlings			
		4. Promote fish farming conservation measures and environmental protection.			

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No.7 INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
7.2.5	Increase local production of Agrochemicals	1. Establish local agrochemical production industries.	Continuo us	MITM	
		2. Promote integrated pests and disease management.	Continuo- us	MAFC	
		3. Train farmers on the requirements and proper application of agrochemicals.			
7.2.6	Supply of Agricultural machinery and implements	1. Privatized farm implements plants to revert to production of agricultural equipment	Start August 2009	MITM MITM	
		2. Embark on local manufacturing of agricultural machinery and farm implements	Start August 2009		
		3. Regional industry strategy to address the needs of the agricultural sector			
7.3 7.3.1	Forward linkages: Expansion of Agro- Processing Industries	1. Enforce measures to discourage export of raw primary products and increase tariffs on imported competing products and conduct regular reviews.	Start August 2009	MITM	
		2. Institute strict measures to curb the dumping of low quality processed agro-products.			
		3. Conduct a "Buy Tanzanian" campaign starting with government procurement			
		4. Re-posses and revive privatized agro-processing factories which have not been operational to date (cashew nuts, tanneries, textiles etc)	July 2010	MITM	MoFEA, MAFC

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No.7 INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
7.3.1	Increase local production of Agrochemicals	5. Support local agro-processors by provision of incentives and other support measures.	July 2010	MITM	MoFEA, MAFC
		6. Support SIDO to promote and expand small scale agro-processing operations.	July 2010	MITM	MoFEA, MAFC
		7. Establish high quality packaging industries to cater for increased packaging of agro-processed products.			
7.3.2	Management of post-harvest losses	1. Establish District food storage facilities	Start August 2009	MITM	TPSF TCCIA
		2. Promote private sector investments in cold storage facilities for perishable and other commodities.			
		3. Train farmers on proper storage and the management of agricultural products			
		4. Promote investments in food fortification to improve nutritional value.			
		1. Establish market data/information centers to facilitate farmers understanding of market developments.			
		2. Improve distribution system to provide quality agricultural inputs timely.			
		3. Address supply side constraints to exports.			
		4. Business Associations/ Chambers to mobilize their members to establish commercial farming, export production, agro- processing and input distribution.			

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 8 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN RESOURCES FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
8.1	Institute mechanism for effective utilization of science, technology and human resources for KILIMO KWANZA	1. Monitor and evaluate existing trained manpower in agriculture	Start August 2009	MAFC	PMO- RALG
		2. Support extension officers to establish demonstration farms and to provide guidance on proper farming methods to farmers			
		3. Set performance targets for extension officers as basis for their evaluation.			
		4. Support Training of Farmers "Para Professionals" and deploy them in every ward.	December 2009	MAFC	PMO- RALG
		5. Intensify training for professionals in soil and water conservation	Continuous	MEVT	
		6. Institute a recruitment program for agricultural specialists including irrigation engineers, hydrologists, dam designers, contractors etc.	December 2009	MAFC	MLEY
		7. Establish Registration Board for Agricultural Specialists.			
		8. Introduce agricultural loans and provide land to entrepreneurial agricultural graduates.	By 2010	MAFC	MoFEA, MLHS, TPSF, Financial Institutions, Tanzania Bankers' Association

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 8 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN RESOURCES FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
8.1		9. Provide full scholarships/loans to Agricultural undergraduates.	By 2010	MEVT	
		10. Develop incentive programs to attract, train and retain youth in Agriculture.	By 2010	MAFC	
		11. Mainstream gender in KILIMO KWANZA and develop programs to strengthen the position of women in Agriculture.	Start August 2009	MAFC	MCGCA
		12. Establish agricultural resource centers cum farm centers – for provision of Agricultural inputs and services.	2010	MAFC	TCCIA, ACT
		13. Agricultural research and training institutions to effectively utilize the Governments allocation of 1% of GDP to research and development.	Continuous	MAFC	MoFEA MCST COSTECH
		14. Establish weather centers at Ward level.	2010	MID	MAFC
		Establish mechanism for Data warehouse and marketing information	2010	MITM	MAFC, TCCIA

## Appendix 3: Continued

PILLAR No. 9 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FOR KILIMO KWANZA					
	ACTIVITY	TASKS	TIME FRAME	RESPONSIBILITY	
				Lead	Key Collaborators
9.1	Identify infrastructure development needs for KILIMO KWANZA	1. Build adequate irrigation schemes targeting priority crops, production volumes and location requirements	Start August 2009	MAFC	PMO- RALG
		2. Establish adequate storage capacity at all levels e.g. cold storage, household storage, national storage for commodities etc.	Continuous	MAFC	MLDF, MID, TPSF
		3. Implement the TPA Master Plan incorporating Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Mtwara, Mwambani and Bagamoyo and Lake Ports along with Dry Port at Kisarawe and trans- shipment at Kidatu.	Start August 2009	MID	TPSF
		4. Finalize construction of Mwanza Airport runway extension for horticulture and fish exports to share chartered flights from KIA through Mwanza to Europe.	Start August 2009	MID	
		5. Complete construction of Mbeya, Iringa and other Airports including cold storage facilities for horticultural exports	By 2010	MID	
		6. Complete national fibre optic network and link with sub- marine cable network	By 2012	MCST	MID, TRL, TANESCO, SONGAS,
		7. Improvement in the railways and road systems	Continuous	MID	
		8. Construct modern abattoirs and meat processing plants in every region.	Start August 2009	MLDF	TPSF
9.2	Market centers in every ward	Establish market centers at Ward level linked with production centers	By 2015	MITM	TCCIA
9.4	Rural electrification for agricultural transformation Allocate adequate resources to the Rural Energy Fund. By 2015 MEM REA	Allocate adequate resources to the Rural Energy Fund.	By 2015 MEM REA		

**Appendix 3: Continued**

<b>PILLAR No. 10 MOBILIZATION OF TANZANIANS FOR KILIMO KWANZA</b>					
	<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>TASKS</b>	<b>TIME FRAME</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITY</b>	
				<b>Lead</b>	<b>Key Collaborators</b>
10.1	Integration of KILIMO KWANZA in Government machinery	Integrate KILIMO KWANZA in the plans of the Central and Local Government	August 2009.	PMO	MAFC, MITM, MLDF, PMO-RALG, MWI, MLHS
10.2	Sensitization campaign on KILIMO KWANZA at national, regional, district, ward and village levels	1. Produce and launch KILIMO KWANZA GREEN BOOK	August 2009	Nane nane	PMO TNBC
		2. Mobilize schools and colleges in the campaign on KILIMO KWANZA	Continuous	MEV T	PMO-RALG
		3. Parliamentarians, Regional and District leadership to disseminate information on KILIMO KWANZA August 2009 PMO PMO-RALG; TNBC	August 2009	PMO	PMO-RALG; TNBC
10.3	Sensitize the private sector to participate in KILIMO KWANZA	1. Enlist effective involvement and participation of the private sector in the implementation of KILIMO KWANZA	Start August 2009	PMO	MICS TPSF
		2. Engage media in drumming up support for KILIMO KWANZA.	Continuous	MOATT	NBC
10.4	Leaders to participate in agricultural production	Mobilize leaders at all levels to be personally involved in agricultural production under KILIMO KWANZA	Start August 2009	PMO	All leaders
10.5	Monitoring and Evaluation of the implementation of KILIMO KWANZA	Prepare and produce quarterly progress reports	Start December 2009	PMO	MAFC TNBC

**Abbreviations:**

ACT	Agriculture Council of Tanzania
BOT	Bank of Tanzania
PPF	Parastatal Pension Fund

REA	Rural Energy Agency
UTT	Unit Trust of Tanzania
ASLM's	Agriculture Sector Lead Ministries
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CMSA	Capital Markets and Securities Authority
DOP's	Development Partners
FBO	Finance Based organisations
GPF	Government Provident Fund
IFI	International Financial Institutions
LAPF	Local Authority Provident Fund
LGA's	Local Government Authorities
MAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives
MCST	Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology
MDA's	Governmental Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEM	Ministry of Energy and Minerals
MEVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
MICS	Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports
MID	Ministry of Infrastructure Development
MITM	Ministry of Industries, Trade and Marketing
MLDF	Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development
MLEY	Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development
MLHS	Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements
MOAT	Media Owners' Association of Tanzania

MoCAJ	Ministry of Justice and Constitution Affairs
MoF	EA Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
MWI	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
NGO's	Non-Governmental Organisations
NSSF	National Social Security Fund
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PMO – RALG	Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administration and Constitution Affairs
POPC	President's Office Planning Commission
PSPF	Parastatal Sector Pension Fund
RALG	Regional Administration and Local Government RC Regional Commissioners
TCCIA	Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
TIC	Tanzania Investment Centre
TNBC	Tanzania National Business Council
TPSF	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation