A new social forestry program has been implemented in Java to overcome encroachment of state forests. In this program, the state and local communities jointly manage the state forests and share the benefits of increased forest resource stock and flow as a result of the management. This article aims to investigate the complete incentive structure of the social forestry program and how the incentive structure changes community member participation in forest management. Property rights transfers and economic analyses were employed to analyze the incentive structure.

In the Brazilian Amazon, insecure property rights are among the main causes of land conflicts and deforestation. Through an in-depth empirical case study in Maranhao in the Eastern Amazon, this research analyzes how distorted agrarian, forest and environmental policies, laws and regulations originated insecure property rights not only over land, but also over timber, which allied to social and political factors, such as uneven distribution of land and strong organization of landless peasants, led to land conflicts and deforestation.

This study tries to examine the determinants of the choice of fuel wood sources in ruralEthiopia. Survey data collected from a sample of rural households in the East Gojam andSouth Wollo zones of the Amhara region of the country were used for the analysis. Amultinomial probit model that allows correlation between the residuals has beenemployed to address the question of whether household’s socioeconomic, environmentand institutional variables affect the choice of fuel wood source in rural Ethiopia.

This paper addresses water scarcity issues in the American West and examines the allocation of water through the appropriative rights system and the extent markets are used to reallocate water from low- to high-valued uses. The unique physical properties of water make it difficult to bound and measure, which makes defining property rights difficult. Markets are also impeded by disputes over third-party effects due to the interdependencies of water users and complex institutional arrangements that dilute decision-making authority.

This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate).

In 1999, an international expert team found the neglect of biodiversity issues in Swiss forest policy to be one of its biggest weaknesses. Influenced by this scientific assessment, the Federal Forest Agency developed forest reserve guidelines with measurable objectives in cooperation with the constituent states (cantons). To assess the outcomes of the Swiss forest reserve concept, we surveyed cantons’ implementation degree in 2011. In a previous paper, Kaeser et al.

The System-wide Program for Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi)sponsored an International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for theManagement of Rangelands in Dry Areas, May 7-11, 2001 in Hammamet, Tunisia.

The paper explores the importance of formal and informal institutionsin setting attitudes of private owners in respect to responsible forest management. Using a qualitative approach, in form of a case study at the level of Suceava County, the study identifies intrinsic values assigned to the forestland leading to attitudes and motivations in the use of the forest resource. The interviewed forest owners have identified the regulatory framework as highly restrictive having as a result various patterns of behaviours from strict compliance with the rules to illegal activities.

During the past two decades agrarian (‘land and farm’) reforms have been widespread in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA), following earlier ones in Asia (China and Vietnam). However, independent family farms did not become the predominant sector in most of Eastern Europe. A new dual (or bi-modal) agrarian structure emerged, consisting of large farm enterprises (with much less social functions than they had before), and very small peasant farms or subsidiary plots.