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Bibliothèque Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation

Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation

Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation

Resource information

Date of publication
Mai 2015
Resource Language
ISBN / Resource ID
OSF_preprint:460F9-D96-CB9

This paper compares the performance of direct negotiation, double auction, and a two-sided combinatorial call market for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms when 1) all commodities need to be traded to achieve efficiency, and 2) subjects are well exposed to various experimental formats. The combinatorial call market performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small. Mechanism design, Two-sided combinatorial auction, Holdout

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Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Tomomi Tanaka

Data Provider
Geographical focus